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THE FUTURE OF TIRE POST-BATSON
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE: VOIR DIRE
BY QUESTIONNAIRE AND THE
"BLIND" PEREMPTORY
Jean Montoya*
This Article examines the peremptory challenge as modified by
Batson and its progeny. The discussion is based in part on a survey
of trial lawyers, asking them about their impressions of the peremp-
tory challenge, Batson, and jury selection generally. The Article con-
cludes that neither the peremptory challenge nor Batson achieve
their full potential. Primarily because of time and other constraints
on voir dire, the peremptory challenge falls short as a tool in shap-
ing fair and impartial juries. While Batson may prevent some un-
lawful discrimination in jury selection, Batson falls short as a tool
in identifying unlawful discrimination once it occurs.
The Article proposes the reform of jury selection procedures to
improve both the effectiveness of the peremptory challenge and
Batson. The proposal is simple: Allow the usual number of alternat-
ing peremptory challenges and allow the complete questioning of the
jury panelists, but allow voir dire by questionnaire only and the
exercise of "blind" peremptories. In a system of blind peremptories,
jury panelists would be identified by number only, and no questions
regarding cognizable group status (e.g., race, ethnicity, or sex) would
be permitted. The suggested reform improves the effectiveness of the
peremptory challenge in eliminating biased jurors. The blind pe-
remptory, coupled with thorough attorney examination of the panel-
ists by questionnaire, frees the litigant to exercise more principled
peremptory challenges. The suggested reform also improves the
effectiveness of Batson in eliminating unlawful discrimination in
jury selection. The blind peremptory prevents unlawful discrim-
ination injury selection by limiting the ability of the litigants to dis-
cern the race, ethnicity, and sex of the jury panelists.
INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses the constitutional restraints on the
exercise of peremptory challenges in jury selection. A peremp-
tory challenge allows a litigant to exclude an otherwise qualified
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. A.B. 1982, Princeton
University; J.D. 1985, University of California at Los Angeles School of Law. I am
grateful to Deborah Kane and Tiffany Kemp for their able research assistance. I am
also grateful to my colleagues, Roy Brooks, Mary Jo Wiggins, and Fred Zacharias, who
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jury panelist from the jury panel during jury selection.1 Former-
ly, a litigant could use the peremptory challenge to exclude a
limited number of panelists from the jury panel for any reason.2
This method ofjury selection worked for a time, at least as long
as jury panels were comprised of affluent white men.? As jury
panels became more diverse and began to include African-Amer-
icans, women, and other groups previously excluded from jury
service,4 however, the peremptory challenge assumed a new and
historically unprecedented role as an instrument of race and
gender discrimination. This situation was tolerated far too long.5
The United States Supreme Court ultimately concluded, how-
ever, that this sort of discrimination in jury selection was
unconstitutional.
In a series of decisions beginning with Batson v. Kentucky,6
the Court began to tackle the problem of race and gender dis-
crimination in jury selection. In 1986, the Court announced in
Batson that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a prosecutor to
exercise race-based peremptory challenges, at least when the
excluded jurors and the defendant share the same race.' Five
1. For a more detailed explanation of the peremptory challenge and how it works,
see infra Part I.
2. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *346 (stating that the peremptory
challenge is "an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge"); see also Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (approving Blackstone's description); Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892) (same).
3. Until the mid-twentieth century, jury lists in most jurisdictions contained
primarily the names of affluent white men. See PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL 80
(1984). See also Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 165
(1989) (observing that peremptory challenges historically "determined which members
of a reasonably elite group of propertied men served on juries"); Akhil Reed Amar,
Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1183 (1995)
(describing the peremptory challenge as "a relic of an imperfectly democratic past" and
arguing that the challenge has outlived its purpose given that jury pools are no longer
homogeneous); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles
of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1094 (1995) (describing the jury as formerly "a
preserve of white, male property owners").
4. See Marder, supra note 3, at 1096-98 (showing that the makeup of the American
jury has changed only recently); Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?-Rethinking
Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 509 (1986)
(describing how the composition of the American jury has changed over time).
5. As late as 1965, the United States Supreme Court condoned a litigant's purpose-
ful exclusion of African-Americans from the jury. Swain, 380 U.S. at 212 (finding merit
in a system that allows for the purposeful exclusion of"any group of otherwise qualified
jurors in any given case, whether they be Negroes, Catholics, accountants or those with
blue eyes"). Not until 1986, more than 20 years later, did the Court officially rectify the
situation. See infra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
6. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
7. See id. at 89.
Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge
years later, in Powers v. Ohio,s the Court clarified its stance,
holding that a prosecutor's race-based peremptory challenges
violate the Equal Protection Clause regardless of whether the
defendant and the excluded jurors are members of the same
race.9 That same year, the Court held that the race-based
peremptory challenges of private civil litigants also violate the
Equal Protection Clause.' ° A year later, in Georgia v. McCol-
lum," the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause precludes
even criminal defendants from exercising race-based peremptory
challenges. 2 Most recently, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,' 3
the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids gender-
based peremptory challenges.' 4
The future of peremptory challenges in jury selection is un-
certain. Appellate litigation regarding Batson's scope is likely
to continue. We can anticipate, for instance, that the Court
eventually will consider whether religion-based peremptory
challenges offend the Equal Protection Clause. 5 Another area
8. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
9. See id. at 402.
10. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991).
11. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
12. See id. at 59.
13. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
14. See id. at 129. For an interesting critique of JE.B., see Roberta K. Flowers,
Does It Cost Too Much? A "Difference" Look at J.E.B. v. Alabama, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
491 (1995) (arguing that courts should read the J.E.B. opinion narrowly because it did
not recognize that the differences between men and women have an impact on the
deliberation process).
15. JE.B. holds that Batson requires nondiscrimination in jury selection when
dealing with classifications subject to strict and heightened scrutiny. See J.E.B., 511 U.S.
at 143 (noting that parties may use their peremptory challenges to exclude any group
normally subject to "rational basis" review). In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982),
the Court held religion-based discrimination subject to strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment. See id. at 244-46.
Arguably, it follows that religion-based peremptory challenges offend Batson. See
Angela J. Mason, Note, Discrimination Based on Religious Affiliation: Another Nail in
the Peremptory Challenge's Coffin? 29 GA. L. REV. 493,522 (1995). Indeed, Justice Scalia
has assumed that J.E.B. effectively extended Batson to religion-based peremptory
challenges. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 161 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that the "Batson
principle... presumably would include religious belief'). In Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S.
Ct. 2120 (1994), denying cert. to 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993), however, the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case raising religion-based peremptory
challenges. See id. In that case, an African-American petitioner argued that the
prosecutor's race-neutral reason for striking a black juror-that the juror was a
Jehovah's Witness-violated the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 2121. Justice
Thomas,joined byJustice Scalia, dissented to the denial of certiorari. See id. at 2120-21.
Legal commentators have concluded that Batson applies to and forbids religion-based
peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination
in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway? 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 764-66 (1992);
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ripe for the Court's consideration is the exercise of peremptory
challenges to exclude jurors because of the panelist's race and
gender, in other words, challenges based on the jury panelist's
intersectionality. 16
This Article explores the future of the peremptory challenge.
Part I examines the peremptory challenge as modified by Batson
and its progeny. Part II appraises Batson by confronting the
assertions of the Batson critics and by assessing Batson's effec-
tiveness in eradicating unlawful discrimination injury selection.
The discussion is based in part on the results from a survey of
trial lawyers, which asked them their impressions of the peremp-
tory challenge, Batson, and jury selection generally. The Article
concludes that neither the peremptory challenge nor Batson
achieves its full potential. Specifically, the peremptory challenge
falls short as a tool in shaping fair and impartial juries, and
Batson falls short in identifying unlawful discrimination in jury
selection. Accordingly, Part III proposes the reform of jury selec-
tion procedures in order to improve both the effectiveness of the
peremptory challenge and Batson: voir dire by questionnaire and
the "blind" peremptory.
Mason, supra, at 524-25, 536-37. But see J. Suzanne Bell Chambers, Note, Applying
the Break: Religion and the Peremptory Challenge, 70 IND. L.J. 569, 593-601 (1995)
(arguing that Batson and J.E.B. should not be extended to religion-based peremptory
challenges because religion differs from race and gender in constitutionally significant
ways).
State courts, on the other hand, generally have concluded that religion-based
peremptory challenges do not violate Batson. See State v. Davis, No. C7-92-1037, 1993
WL 593, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 1993), affd, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993); State
v. Lundgren, Nos. 90-L-15-140, 91-L-036, 1993 WL 346444, at *39 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
14, 1993), affd, 653 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio 1995); Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 495-96
(Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (reasoning that"it is permissible to discriminate against prospec-
tive jurors on account of their beliefs" and that "discrimination on the basis of religion
is discrimination on the basis of belief").
Some state courts have observed, however, that their state constitutions (as distinct
from Batson, which relies on the federal constitution) forbid religion-based peremptory
challenges. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62 (Cal. 1978); State v.
Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849 (Haw. 1990); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499,
515 & n.29, 516 n.33 (Mass.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); People v. Kagan, 420
N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
16. Challenges based on intersectionality purposely exclude jurors who are both
of a particular race and a particular gender, for example, African-American women or
Latino men. See Jean Montoya, 'What's So Magic[alUAbout Black Women?" Peremptory
Challenges at the Intersection of Race and Gender, 3 MiCH. J. GENDER & L. 369 (1996)
(arguing that Batson should be extended to intersectional discrimination in jury selec-
tion).
Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge
I. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE: AN OVERVIEW
The exercise of peremptory challenges provides a litigant with
an opportunity to shape the jury that will decide the litigant's
case at trial. Procedures vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
but generally the exercise of peremptory challenges proceeds as
follows: A panel of potential jurors (the venire) is summoned
into the courtroom for questioning by the court and litigants
(voir dire). The court typically inquires into the general back-
ground of the jury panelists-residential area, occupation,
marital status, prior jury service and the like-and then the
litigants question the panelists, probing for biases that may bear
on the case. Following the examination of the jury panelists, the
litigants exercise challenges for cause by asking the court to
exclude certain jury panelists for specific, legally recognized rea-
sons. 7 After the exercise of unlimited challenges for cause, the
litigants alternately exercise their peremptory challenges.
Unlike challenges for cause, peremptory challenges are limited
in number."i Also unlike challenges for cause, the litigant
ordinarily need not specify the reason for excluding a particular
jury panelist.' 9
The peremptory challenge serves at least four widely recog-
nized purposes. First, the peremptory challenge allows the
litigants to "eliminate extremes of partiality" on the venire.2
Accordingly, at least in theory, it operates to secure for the
litigants a fair and impartial jury.2 ' Second, it gives the parties
17. The grounds for challenges for cause are often statutorily enumerated.
Grounds include, but are not limited to, actual bias (a jury panelist admits during
questioning the inability to be fair and impartial in the particular case), see, e.g., CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 225(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1996); implied bias (familial or business
ties exist between a jury panelist and one of the litigants or witnesses), see, e.g., id.
§§ 225(b)(1)(B), 229; and disqualifications based on citizenship, age, residence, and
English language ability, see, e.g., id. §§ 203, 225(b)(1)(A).
18. See, e.g., id. § 231(a) (allowing the prosecution and the defense 20 peremptory
challenges each in cases involving the possibility of a life or death sentence and 10
peremptory challenges each for other cases). See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *347
(observing that peremptory challenges must have "[slome reasonable boundary" and
noting that the common law allowed a prisoner 35 such challenges).
19. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (describing the "essential
nature of the peremptory challenge" as "one exercised without a reason stated").
20. Id. at 219.
21. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (observing that peremptory
challenges "traditionally have been viewed as one means of assuring the selection of a
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some control over the jury selection process and thereby en-
hances the litigants' confidence in the proceedings and respect
for the jury's ultimate verdict.22 Third, it permits litigants to
probe for biases during voir dire without fear of alienating a
potential juror.23 Even if no grounds for a challenge for cause
appear, the litigant can exercise a peremptory challenge to ex-
clude a panelist who may have been antagonized by the liti-
gant's questioning. Fourth, it serves as a safety net of sorts for
those instances when the challenge for cause is wrongly denied
or cannot be demonstrated, but the litigant still believes that the
jury panelist harbors bias.
24
qualified and unbiased jury"); see also Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its
Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545,550-51 (1975) (explaining how the peremptory
challenge ensures an impartial jury); Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary E. Powers, Peremp-
tory Challenges and the Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD.
L. REV. 337, 341-42 (1982) (decrying constitutional restrictions on the exercise of
peremptory challenges).
22. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (observing
that "the role of litigants in determining the jury's composition provides one reason for
wide acceptance of the jury system and of its verdicts"); Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (arguing
that the "function of the challenge is not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both
sides, but to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide
on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise"); see also
BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *347 (emphasizing"that a prisoner... should have a good
opinion ofhisjury"); Babcock, supra note 21, at 552 ("[T]he peremptory challenge teaches
the litigant, and through him the community, that... [the jury's] decision should be
followed because in a real sense the jury belongs to the litigant: he chooses it.");
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 21, at 356 (asserting that allowing the litigant to remove
unwanted jury panelists is a means of ensuring that a litigant has "a good opinion of
the jury"); Underwood, supra note 15, at 771 (observing that the peremptory challenge
provides the litigants "an opportunity to participate in the construction of the decision-
making body, thereby enlisting their confidence in its decision").
23. See Swain, 380 US. at 219-20 (noting the possibility of incurring a jury
panelist's hostility during voir dire); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892)
(quoting Blackstone regarding the need to exclude jury panelists offended by voir dire).
See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at *347 (observing that "the bare questioning [of
a jury panelist's] indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment"); Babcock, supra
note 21, at 554-55 (recognizing the need to exclude jury panelists alienated by voir dire);
Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 21, at 356 (observing that extensive voir dire regarding
possible biases can alienate a jury panelist); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 106
HARv. L. REV. 163, 247 (1992) (observing that inquiries into potential bias can insult
and alienate jury panelists).
24. See Babcock, supra note 21, at 549-50 (noting the reluctance ofjudges to find
bias and grant the challenge for cause); Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We
Have Learned about Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447,
486 (1996) (observing that lawyers "rely so heavily upon their peremptory challenges"
because trial judges "rely upon the peremptory challenge as a substitute for the
meaningful examination of challenges for cause"); Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 21,
at 355-56 (describing jury panelists as reluctant to admit bias and judges as reluctant
to find bias); Underwood, supra note 15, at 771 (characterizing the peremptory challenge
as "an essential failback for use when a challenge for cause is rejected").
Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge
A. The Evolution of Batson
Prior to Batson, in Swain v. Alabama,25 the United States
Supreme Court actually condoned the exercise of group-based
peremptory challenges, including peremptory challenges based
on race.26 In Swain, the African-American male defendant
demonstrated that there were eight African-Americans on his
venire but that none actually served, two being exempt and six
having been challenged by the prosecutor during jury selection."
The defendant claimed that the prosecutor purposely excluded
the black jury panelists in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.2" The Court, however, declined to hold that purposely
excluding black jury panelists in a particular case violates the
Equal Protection Clause.29 Instead, it reasoned, "[i]n the quest
for an impartial and qualified jury, Negro and white, Protestant
and Catholic, are alike subject to being challenged without
cause."3° Indeed, the Court identified the pluralistic nature of
American society as necessitating the opportunity to make race-
based peremptory challenges.31
Of course, since Swain, the Court has recast its position on
the subject of race-based peremptory challenges in a particular
case. In Batson, the Court held that purposely excluding black
jury panelists in a particular case violated the Equal Protection
Clause.32 In that case, the defendant, a black man, objected
when the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to exclude
all four black persons on the venire, producing an all white
jury.33 While Batson was framed in terms of a criminal defen-
dant's Equal Protection right not to have members of the defen-
dant's race excluded because of their race,34 subsequent cases
have framed the issue in terms of the right of jury panelists not
25. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
26. See id. at 220-21.
27. See id. at 205.
28. See id. at 210.
29. See id. at 221, 223. The Court observed, however, that the prosecutor's exclusion
of black jury panelists in case after case, such that no black panelist ever served on a
jury, would violate the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 223.
30. Id. at 221.
31. See id. at 218, 222.
32. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 US. 79, 89 (1986).
33. See id. at 82-83.
34. See id. at 85-86.
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to be excluded because of their race35-a right that litigants can
assert on behalf of the excluded jury panelist(s).36 It thus has
become increasingly clear that race cannot serve as a proxy for
determining juror bias or competence.37 In contrast to Swain,
the Court in both Batson and J.E.B. has recognized that the
pluralistic nature of our society requires the prohibition of race-
and gender-based peremptory challenges, respectively.3
The Court clarified the reach of Batson's prohibition in
J.E.B.,3 holding that gender also could not serve as a proxy for
determining juror bias or competence.4" The Court based its
decision prohibiting gender-based peremptory challenges on the
history of women's exclusion from American political life and
compared the nature and extent of that exclusion to the exclu-
sion of African-Americans from American political life. The
Court cited laws depriving women of various rights associated
with citizenship, such as jury service, voting, holding political
35. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1992) (prohibiting a criminal
defendant's exercise of race-based peremptory challenges as violative of the rights of the
potential juror); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618-19 (1991)
(prohibiting a civil litigant's exercise of race-based peremptory challenges because it
would violate the Equal Protection rights of those excluded from jury service); Powers
v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,406-09 (1991) (prohibiting race-based peremptory challenges even
when the excluded jury panelist and the objecting defendant are not of the same race
because discriminatory use of peremptory challenges also harms excluded jurors).
36. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 55-56 (holding that the state has standing to
challenge a criminal defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges);
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628-30 (holding that a civil litigant has standing to challenge
an opposing litigant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges); Powers, 499 U.S.
at 410-15 (holding that a white criminal defendant has standing to challenge the state's
use of peremptory challenges to exclude black jury panelists).
37. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 410.
38. - See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (noting that "[iun view of the
heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our criminal justice system
and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from
jury service because of his race"); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994)
("When persons are excluded from participation in our democratic processes solely
because of race or gender, th[e] promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial
system is jeopardized."); see also Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 630-31 (admonishing that "[ilf
our society is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that
the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress"); Marder, supra note
3, at 1083 (observing that peremptory challenges based on group identity are inconsis-
tent with democratic ideals).
39. The reasoning in Batson is somewhat obscure, perhaps because the defendant-
petitioner, apparently discouraged by the Court's Equal Protection Clause analysis in
Swain, based his claim on the Sixth Amendment, and, as a result, the briefs and
argument failed to develop an Equal Protection Clause analysis. See Batson, 476 U.S.
at 112-18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
40. See JE.B., 511 US. 127, 129 (1994).
Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge
office, bringing suit, and holding property as examples of
exclusion.4 It compared these laws to laws specifically excluding
African-Americans.42 The Court reasoned that, under Equal
Protection Clause analysis, this history of exclusion required the
heightened scrutiny of gender-based discrimination,43 and that
gender-based peremptory challenges could not survive such
scrutiny.4 The Court made clear that, although men have been
favored historically for inclusion on juries and in other aspects
of American political life, they, like women, are a cognizable
group and the state's intentional exclusion of them from the jury
panel also would violate the Equal Protection Clause.45 The
Court also made clear, however, that peremptory challenges may
be exercised to "remove from the venire any group or class of
individuals normally subject to 'rational basis' review"46 and
offered occupation-based challenges as an example of permissible
group-based discrimination in the exercise of peremptory
challenges.47
B. The Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge in Operation
If working properly, then, the post-Batson peremptory chal-
lenge functions as follows: Assume a charge of battery on a law
enforcement officer. The offered defense is self-defense in res-
ponse to the use of unreasonable force by the law enforcement
officer. The defense would exercise its peremptory challenges to
exclude law enforcement officers, the friends and relatives of
law enforcement officers, and anyone who might be perceived
as a law-and-order type. The prosecution would exercise its
41. See id. at 131-36.
42. See id. at 135-36.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 136-42 (assessing whether gender discrimination in jury selection
substantially furthers the State's legitimate interest in a fair and impartial jury and
concluding that it does not).
45. See id. at 141-42. Although the result (forbidding the purposeful exclusion of
male jury panelists when it is women who have been historically excluded from
American political life) may seem absurd, it stems from the Court's focus on discrim-
ination as opposed to subordination. The Court believed that affording women protection
from gender-based peremptory challenges but not extending the same protection to men
denied men equal protection under the law. See also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,
423-24 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. JE.B., 511 U.S. at 143.
47. See id. at 142 n.14.
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peremptory challenges to exclude anyone who has had a bad
experience with law enforcement officers, the friends and
relatives of those who have had negative experiences with law
enforcement officers, and anyone who might be perceived as an
anti-establishment type. When the exercise of each side's pe-
remptory challenges was completed, theoretically the impartial
jury panelists4 8 (those who have had no personal experience or
familiarity with police brutality or law enforcement) would
48. Proponents of the peremptory challenge system value the ignorance or "impar-
tiality" of jurors; that is, they favor jurors who will be free from "bias" so that they can
base their decision on the evidence presented by the parties at trial. Mark Cammack,
In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 428-34 (1995). This model,
however, is arguably flawed. It assumes that truth is objective and that the human
observer and the external world are separable. Modern cognitive theory posits different
conceptions of truth and the human observer:
[T]he mind has come to be seen not as a mirror reflecting exact images of reality,
but as a lens through which external reality is refracted .... All experience is
mediated by preexisting knowledge structures, constellations of assumptions,
interests, and purposes that filter and organize perception as it occurs. And
because the minds that take the world in are a product of their time and place,
their representations of reality are likewise socially conditioned and partial to
some degree....
... Because all perception is dependent on the interpretive apparatus of the
observer, truth is invariably relative to a community that shares the same
conventions of interpretation. No perspective can claim priority on the basis of
privileged access to the truth.
Cammack, supra, at 416-17, 420 (footnotes omitted); see also Martha Minow, Stripped
Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and
Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1201, 1208 (1992) (advocating a collaborative decision-
making process based on the inclusion of multiple perspectives); M.A. Widder, Com-
ment, Neutralizing the Poison of Juror Racism: The Need for a Sixth Amendment
Approach to Jury Selection, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2311, 2324-25 (1993) (advocating a jury
that is "well rounded").
These modern conceptions of truth and the human observer do not support excluding
the biased, for everyone is biased. Instead, they support including as many perspectives
as possible, provided that the jurors are "willing to suspend judgment, to attempt to see
things from another perspective, and to learn." Cammack, supra, at 485. As Professor
Martha Minow explains:
None of us can know anything except by building upon, challenging, responding
to what we already have known, what we see from where we stand. But we can
insist on seeing what we are used to seeing, or else we can try to see something
new and fresh. The latter is the open mind we hope for from those who judge, but
not the mind as a sieve without prior reference points and commitments.
Minow, supra, at 1217.
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remain.49 After Batson, the litigants cannot exclude a particular
race of jury panelists on the assumption that they have a bias
in favor of the defendant or a prejudice against law enforce-
ment. Assuming no showing of pretext to discriminate against
black jury panelists, however, litigants lawfully may exclude
panelists who have had negative experiences with law en-
forcement officers, even if that means excluding all black jury
panelists.5"
II. BATsoN: AN APPRAISAL
A. The Erroneous Assertions of the Batson Critics
Batson jurisprudence has had its critics. The dissenting and
concurring Justices in Batson and its progeny argue that the
decisions neglect important considerations. They spotlight the
pedigree of the peremptory challenge and extol its role in
securing a fair and impartial jury.51 They regret that Batson
and its progeny disregard the history and function of the
peremptory challenge, and instead restrict the exercise of
49. In reality, "in a diverse society the peremptory challenge is actually a stack-
ing tool that favors majority interests while handicapping the party who would benefit
from minority representation on the jury." Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative
Selection: A New Response to Peremptory Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REv. 781, 800
(1986). That is, if the venire is likely to have more law-and-order types than anti-
establishment types, the likelihood is that the prosecution will eliminate all the anti-
establishment types, but the defense will not eliminate all the law-and-order types.
This sort of "stacking" may occur because peremptory challenges are limited in
number. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
50. To exclude these jurors, however, is arguably to exclude a black perspective on
police conduct. Inclusion advocates would argue that this exclusion undermines truth-
seeking insofar as it excludes this black perspective. Cf supra note 48. Only the
elimination of peremptory challenges could prevent this sort of exclusion.
51. See JE.B., 511 U.S. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that the
"peremptory's importance is confirmed by its persistence: it was well established at the
time of Blackstone and continues to endure in all the States"); id. at 163 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing Batson jurisprudence as a "vandalizing of our people's tradi-
tions"); Batson, 476 U.S. at 112, 118-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (lamenting that "the
Court sets aside the peremptory challenge, a procedure which has been part of the
common law for many centuries and part of our jury system for nearly 200 years"); id.
at 137 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (declining to "subscribe to the Court's unprecedented
use of the Equal Protection Clause to restrict the historic scope of the peremptory
challenge"). For a history of the peremptory challenge, see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 212-19 (1965).
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peremptory challenges in order to prevent the intentional
exclusion of certain groups from juries.52
These Justices also predict doom for the implementation of
Batson. Their more notable assertions are that Batson interjects
racial matters into the jury selection process,53 diminishes the
ability of litigants to act on sometimes accurate group-based
assumptions (or stereotypes),' 4 forces "'the peremptory challenge
[to] collapse into the challenge for cause,' 5 effectively abolishes
the peremptory challenge, 56 and lengthens trials that are already
too long.57 This Article will now address each of these concerns.
52. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 125 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (observing that
"[pleremptory challenges have long been viewed as a means to achieve an impartial jury
that will be sympathetic toward neither an accused nor witnesses for the State on the
basis of some shared factor of race, religion, occupation, or other characteristic"). In his
dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted:
The use of group affiliations, such as age, race, or occupation, as a "proxy" for
potential juror partiality, based on the assumption or belief that members of one
group are more likely to favor defendants who belong to the same group, has long
been accepted as a legitimate basis for the State's exercise of peremptory challenges.
Id. at 138.
53. See id. at 129 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
54. See J.E.B., 511 US. at 149 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that gender
or race may affect a juror's verdict, but that J.E.B. renders "any correlation between a
juror's gender and attitudes ... irrelevant as a matter of constitutional law"); Batson,
476 U.S at 138-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing group affiliations, including
race, as a legitimate proxy for potential juror partiality in the exercise of peremptory
challenges).
55. Batson, 476 U.S. at 127 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984)).
56. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 425 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 149 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that the prohibition on
gender-based discrimination in jury selection comes "a step closer to eliminating the
peremptory challenge"). Some legal commentators have joined the justices in their more
extreme assertions about Batson's effect on the peremptory challenge. See, e.g., J.
Christopher Peters, Note, Georgia v. McCollum: It's Strike Three for Peremptory
Challenges, But is it the Bottom of the Ninth?, 53 LA. L. REV. 1723, 1755-57 (1993)
(asserting that "peremptory challenges have outlived their usefulness" and have become
"watered-down" challenges for cause); Susan A. Winchurch, Note, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B.: The Supreme Court Moves Closer to Elimination of the Peremptory Challenge,
54 MD. L. REv. 261,262-63 (1995) (asserting that"the Court's extension ofBatson princi-
ples to gender-based peremptory challenges has compromised the peremptory challenge
to such a degree that it is no longer an effective litigation tool"). But see Underwood,
supra note 15, at 768-73 (arguing that Batson limits but does not destroy the value of
the peremptory challenge).
57. See JE.B., 511 U.S. at 147 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing Batson "mini-
hearings" as "routine"); id. at 162 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that Batson and its
progeny spawn "extensive collateral litigation"); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,
500 U.S. 614, 645 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that "the amount ofjudges' and
lawyers' time devoted to implementing [Batson and its progeny] will be enormous" and
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1. Batson Does Not Disregard History and Interject Race into
the Jury Selection Process-The Batson critics' appeal to history
in defense of the peremptory challenge seems wrongheaded.
Blacks and women historically were excluded from jury service,
so the use of peremptory challenges to exclude them as jurors
from a particular trial in earlier times was simply not an issue.58
Perhaps the peremptory challenge could go unquestioned in an
earlier society with different values-in a society in which only
affluent white males sat on juries."9 Contemporary American
society, however, apparently values more heterogeneous juries.
60
The use of peremptory challenges to exclude certain groups from
juries ignores changes in the historical context and contravenes
modern values by rendering the prospect of heterogeneous juries
elusive, perpetuating stereotypes and prejudices, and subordi-
nating socially significant minority groups.6'
Similarly, to say that Batson interjects race into the jury
selection process misses the point. The use of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race already has injected
race into the jury selection process.62
2. Batson Does Not Unduly Limit the Ability of Parties to Act
on Group-Based Assumptions-Batson and its progeny do
diminish the ability of parties to act on sometimes accurate
group-based assumptions, but not to a worrisome degree. Con-
curring in J.E.B., Justice O'Connor observed that
like race, gender matters .... [Olne need not be a sexist to
share the intuition that in certain cases a person's gender
that "[tihat time will be diverted from other matters"); Batson, 476 U.S. at 125 n.7
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (predicting that voir dire will become "Title VII proceeding[s]
in miniature").
58. See JE.B., 511 U.S. at 141 n.15 (recognizing that various traditions, like "de
jure segregation and the total exclusion of women from juries, are now unconstitutional
even though they once co-existed with the Equal Protection Clause"); see also Marder,
supra note 3, at 1093-94 (arguing that adherence to tradition makes no sense given that
the jury and the peremptory challenge have changed over time); Massaro, supra note
4, at 510 (arguing that the problem of discrimination injury selection "cannot be solved
by reference to history").
59. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
61. See JE.B., 511 U.S. at 138-40, 146.
62. The argument that Batson has interjected race into the jury selection process
is reminiscent of the argument that affirmative action has stigmatized and demeaned
its intended beneficiaries. Yet, "affirmative action did not cause stigma to attach to
selected racial groups; society already had taken care of that." John E. Morrison,
Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit:AnAnalysisoftheRhetoricAgainstAffirmative
Action, 79 IowA L. REv. 313, 343 (1994). Any criticism of Batson on this point would
have similar flaws.
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and resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her
view of the case. "Jurors are not expected to come into the
jury box and leave behind all that their human experience
has taught them."63
J.E.B. does not so much contest the observation that race and
gender matter as much as it prohibits the lawyer from acting
on that assumption without more.' Instead, any race- or gender-
based assumption must be demonstrably accurate in the case
of each individual jury panelist for whom the opponent demon-
strates a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.65 In
other words, information or observations gained from voir dire
(other than the excluded jury panelist's race or gender) must
evidence the jury panelist's bias or otherwise support a permis-
sible reason for excluding the jury panelist.66
The reason: race and gender may matter, but the reason that
they may matter--centuries of discrimination and subordination
based on these characteristics-makes exclusion from jury
service based on race or gender particularly intolerable.67
Moreover, although race and gender may matter, how they
matter is often unknowable. Race and gender characteristics
may interact with each other and with a host of other charac-
teristics, such as age, income, occupation, education, political
affiliation, and religion, to make any one characteristic an
unreliable indicator of bias.68
For instance, a male defendant in a sexual harassment case
could assume that women, as a group, are more likely than men
to have suffered sexual harassment, and that women who have
suffered sexual harassment would have a bias in favor of the
female plaintiff. Defense counsel therefore might seek to exclude
63. 511 U.S. at 148-49 (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 642 (1980)).
64. See id. at 139 n.11 (acknowledging that "a shred of truth may be contained in
some stereotypes, but [requiring] that state actors look beyond the surface before making
judgments about people that are likely to stigmatize as well as to perpetuate historical
patterns of discrimination").
65. See id. at 138-40.
66. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (observing
that biases "can be explored in a rational way... without the use of classifications based
on ancestry or skin color").
67. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
68. Marder, supra note 3, at 1077-83 (rejecting the idea that "people can[] be
reduced to one characteristic"). Cf. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 512 & n.10 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that focusing on achieving a racially balanced jury
"would likely distort the jury's reflection of other groups in society, characterized by age,
sex, ethnicity, religion, education level, or economic class").
994
Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge
women jury panelists. In the case of any individual woman
panelist, however, the opposite could just as well be true. For
instance, polls conducted during the Clarence Thomas confirma-
tion hearings demonstrated that women who have been ha-
rassed may be skeptical of another woman's claims. 9 Professor
Martha Minow considers the possibilities:
Perhaps the complainant did not respond the way the
adjudicator did or would have; perhaps the complainant
appears disloyal or otherwise blameworthy in the eyes of the
adjudicator. These alternatives simply point to the multiple
directions that bias may take, but not to its absence. Would
restricting decisionmaking to a man or group of men be any
better?...
[Men] might identify with the accused and might worry
about being accused themselves. They might worry about
false accusations and the difficulty of rebutting them. They
might worry about true accusations, yet not believe them
serious enough to warrant public sanction. They also might
worry about true accusations and seek to show their ability
to overcome any appearance of bias by coming down hard on
the accused.7"
For the same reason, it would be overly simplistic to assume
that black jurors are biased in favor of other blacks and there-
fore exclude black jury panelists in a case involving a black
defendant. While some members of minority groups may be
sympathetic to members of their own group, others may
"respond to discrimination and prejudice by attempting to
disassociate themselves from the group, even to the point of
adopting the majority's negative attitudes towards the minor-
ity."7' In addition, blacks sometimes witness and are victimized
69. See Felicity Barringer, The Thomas Confirmation: Hill's Case is Divisive to
Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at A12.
70. Minow, supra note 48, at 1208-09.
71. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,503 nn.2-3 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(citing social science evidence); see also Babcock, supra note 21, at 553 (citing the 1969
criminal trial of 21 Black Panthers on multiple charges of violent crimes in New York
for the proposition that "black males as a class can be biased against young alienated
blacks who have not tried to join the middle class"). In that litigation, the defendants
challenged about as many black jury panelists as the prosecution. See id. at 553 n.30.
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by black-on-black crime and as a result may actually be preju-
diced against the black defendant. For example, a black woman
juror, commenting on jury service in the District of Columbia,
made the following observation:
Some defense lawyers may feel that the predominantly
middle-aged, predominantly black jury most often chosen in
the District is more sympathetic to the black defendant. But
they are espousing ... another bit of folklore. In fact, quite
the opposite is true. Enough crime is enough, such juries
feel. We are the victims. You see it on the unsigned exit
questionnaires handed out at month's end in the early-
sunset wintertime. "Give us more protection walking from
the Courthouse to the bus." Or "This is a high crime neigh-
borhood; don't hold us in the court past dark."72
Batson diminishes the ability of parties to act on group-based
assumptions. The cost to the parties, however, is somewhat
elusive. The cost perceived by the Batson critics assumes that
the group-based assumption is accurate, that the individual jury
panelist fits the group-based assumption, and that voir dire will
not expose the panelist's bias.73 Of course, any one of these
assumptions might not hold true. If the stereotype is not empiri-
cally supported, if an individual jury panelist does not fit the
stereotype, or if the jury panelist's bias is exposed during voir
dire, then the litigant who would otherwise rely on the stereo-
type loses nothing.
3. Batson Has Neither Effectively Eliminated the Peremptory
Challenge, nor Caused it to Collapse into the Challenge for
Cause-Batson and its progeny undeniably alter the exercise of
the peremptory challenge. Whether Batson has caused the
peremptory challenge to collapse into the challenge for cause or
has effectively abolished the peremptory challenge is another
matter.
72. Natalie Davis Spingarn, Eye the Jury, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1972, at P16.
73. Dissenting in JE.B., Justice Scalia opined that even expanded voir dire would
not help litigants select a fair and impartial jury in a post-Batson trial: "The biases that
go along with group characteristics tend to be biases that the juror himself does not
perceive, so that it is no use asking about them. It is fruitless to inquire of a male juror
whether he harbors any subliminal prejudice in favor of unwed fathers." 511 U.S. 127,
162 (1994). Assuming that subliminal prejudice cannot be demonstrated or exposed,
however, should we allow parties to assume bias and exclude on the basis of race and




Although the challenge for cause has always required the
lawyer to articulate a basis for excluding a jury panelist, the
hallmark of the pre-Batson peremptory challenge was the ability
to exclude a jury panelist without articulating a reason. 4 After
Batson and its progeny, a lawyer may not exercise race- or
gender-based peremptory challenges, and a litigant may be
required to articulate the basis for his or her challenges. If the
lawyer opposing the peremptory challenge establishes a prima
facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury selection, the
lawyer making the challenge must articulate a race- or gender-
neutral reason for excluding the jury panelist.7 5 Assuming that
the lawyer's explanation is facially valid,76 the trial court must
determine whether the opponent of the peremptory challenge
has carried his or her burden of proving purposeful discrimi-
nation.7 The trial court may find that a facially valid explana-
tion for a peremptory challenge really serves as a pretext for
purposeful discrimination.78
Batson nevertheless makes clear that although a litigant
cannot rebut a prima facie case of discrimination "merely by
denying that he had a discriminatory motive or 'affirm[ing] [his]
good faith in making individual selections,' ,71 the litigant's
"explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a
74. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
75. See Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1770 (1995). But see Stephen R. Diprima,
Note, Selecting a Jury in Federal Criminal Trials after Batson and McCollum, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 888, 904 (1995) (observing that trial courts frequently require an
explanation for peremptory challenges without first analyzing whether the objecting
party has demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination).
76. See Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771 (rejecting the notion that a proffered neutral
explanation must be persuasive or plausible, because that requirement would shift the
burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation from the opponent to the maker of a
peremptory challenge).
77. See id. at 1770-71. Demonstrating disproportionate impact in the absence of
purposeful discrimination does not suffice to show a Batson violation. See Hernandez
v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 362 (1991) (upholding the exclusion of bilingual jurors even
though the exclusion would have a disproportionate impact on Latino jury panelists).
However, disproportionate impact may evidence purposeful discrimination. See id. at
363.
78. See Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. See also David A. Sutphen, Note, True Lies: The
Role of Pretext Evidence Under Batson v. Kentucky in the Wake of St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks, 94 MICH. L. REv. 488, 506-10 (1995) (arguing that, at least in the
Batson context, courts should treat proof of pretext as the legal equivalent of proof of
purposeful discrimination).
79. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)).
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challenge for cause." 0 Moreover, the Batson critics are far
removed from the trial court procedures that they have declared
doomed. In order to assess the effect of Batson on the actual
practice of exercising peremptory challenges, I explored the more
extreme assertions of these critics and other questions in a
survey of state and federal trial lawyers.
a. A Survey of Trial Lawyers-In the summer of 1994, I
drafted and distributed a written survey8' to 664 San Diego trial
attorneys: 82 92 Assistant U.S. Attorneys, 259 Deputy District
Attorneys, 65 Deputy City Attorneys, 23 Federal Public Defend-
ers, 195 Deputy Public Defenders, and 30 Alternate Public
Defenders. 3 Of the 664 surveys sent, 197 anonymous surveys
were returned in pre-addressed, pre-stamped return envelopes.'
Of the 197 returned surveys, 98 were completed by prosecutors,
96 by defense attorneys, and 3 by attorneys who did not identify
themselves as either prosecutors or defense attorneys. 85 Of the
197 returned surveys, 9 were completed by exclusively federal
court practitioners, 150 were completed by exclusively state
court practitioners, and 36 were completed by lawyers who had
practiced in both federal and state courts.86 The lawyers who
responded to the survey had extensive trial experience-20 had
conducted 0-10 trials, 30 had conducted 11-25 trials, 66 had
conducted 26-50 trials, 50 had conducted 51-100 trials, and 29
had conducted more than 100 trials.87 Significantly, 23 of the
80. Id. at 97.
81. See infra app. A for a copy of the survey. Of course, surveys rely on self-
reporting to gather information, and the value of survey research depends highly on the
reliability of the survey subjects. Successful survey research depends on the survey
subject being knowledgeable, self-aware, honest, and cooperative. Readers should
consider the results of survey research with this limitation in mind.
82. The survey was distributed to criminal law practitioners in public service
because these practitioners typically have substantial trial experience and are easy to
identify on various attorney rosters. Distribution was based on attorney rosters for the
following agencies: the Office of the United States Attorney, Southern District of
California--Criminal Division; the County of San Diego Office of the District Attorney;
the City Attorney's Office-Criminal Division; Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.; the
County of San Diego Department of the Public Defender; and the Alternate Public
Defender Office.
83. Alternate Public Defenders handle cases that the Public Defender does not
accept for a variety of reasons, primarily conflicts of interest.
84. See survey responses (on file with author).
85. See infra app. A, question 16, asking responding attorneys to describe their
professional experience. See infra app. B, tbl. 1, for a profile of the attorneys who
returned the survey. For unknown reasons, not all questions were answered on a few
of the returned surveys.
86. See infra app. B, tbl. 1.
87. See id.
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lawyers with federal court experience spent some time practicing
pre-Batson, and 73 of the lawyers with state court experience
spent some time practicing pre-Wheeler (California's Batson
counterpart)."8 These lawyers therefore would be able to compare
pre- and post-Batson and pre- and post-Wheeler practice, respec-
tively.
The surveyed attorneys were asked about peremptory chal-
lenges, Batson/Wheeler motions, and jury selection generally.
Specifically, the attorneys were asked the following questions:
How valuable are peremptory challenges to litigants,8 9 and were
peremptory challenges of any more value pre-Batson (or pre-
Wheeler)?9" How often were Batson (or Wheeler) motions made
in cases you personally tried?9' Do Batson/Wheeler motions take
up too much court time?92 How difficult or easy is it to establish
a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination93 and to rebut
a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination? 94 Is the venire
adequately questioned before the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges?95 How is the venire questioned?9 Do Batson/Wheeler
motions prevent unlawful discrimination in jury selection? 7
Should peremptory challenges be eliminated from the jury
88. Predating Batson, the California Supreme Court prohibited peremptory
challenges based on "group bias" but permitted challenges based on "specific bias."
People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761-62 (Cal. 1978). The court defined "specific bias"
as a bias relating to the particular case on trial and "group bias" as the presumption
that certain jurors are biased merely because of their membership in an identifiable
group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. See id. at 761.
Wheeler held that the use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on the
basis of group bias violated the state constitutional right to trial by a jury drawn from
a representative cross-section of the community. See id. at 761-62. Like Batson, however,
Wheeler held that a showing of specific bias could support a peremptory challenge. See
id. at 762.
Some legal scholars and commentators have advocated the applicability of the Sixth
Amendment's fair cross-section requirement to the government's discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges in jury selection. See, e.g., Marder, supra note 3, at 1128-34,
1138; Massaro, supra note 4, at 536-39; Widder, supra note 48, at 2331-32. However,
the Supreme Court has limited the Sixth Amendment fair cross-section requirement to
the empaneling of jury venires. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 478 (1990).
89. See infra app. A, questions 1 and 2.
90. See id. questions 3 and 4.
91. See id. question 5.
92. See id. question 6.
93. See id. question 7.
94. See id. question 8.
95. See id. questions 9 and 10.
96. See id. question 11.
97. See id. questions 12 and 13.
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selection process?9" The surveyed attorneys were also asked to
explain why they answered certain questions as they did.99
b. Trial Lawyers Assert that the Peremptory Challenge Re-
mains Valuable-Despite the constitutional restrictions on the
exercise of peremptory challenges, and despite the impressions
of the Batson critics, practitioners overwhelmingly described
peremptory challenges as valuable. Of the lawyers who an-
swered the question regarding the value of peremptory chal-
lenges,'00 81% described peremptory challenges as having great
value.' An additional 18% described peremptory challenges as
having some value. Fewer than 1% described peremptory
challenges as having no value. Prosecutors and defense attor-
neys, as well as federal court and state court practitioners,
generally agreed that peremptory challenges were valuable. 2
The reasons most often cited by lawyers for why peremptory
challenges are valuable were the following: Peremptory chal-
lenges allow litigants to exclude jurors with whom the attorney
has "bad chemistry" or to exclude jurors on the basis of "gut
feeling." Peremptory challenges allow litigants to exclude jurors
when challenges for cause should have been granted but were
not, or to exclude jurors with attitudes and experiences that
would not support a challenge for cause but would support an
inference of bias against the client or the client's case theory.
98. See id. questions 14 and 15.
99. The answers to relevant survey questions were assigned a numerical value and
two formulas were used to determine statistical significance: the t test when a question
asked respondents to choose from four or more possible answers, and the chi-square test
when a question asked respondents to choose from three or fewer possible answers. See
DEAN J. CHAMPION, BASIc STATLSTICS FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 171-76,234-39,243-46 (2d ed.
1981). A finding of significance indicates that there is a low probability that the
difference between the obtained sample means is due to random error. That is, a finding
of significance indicates real differences.
100. See infra app. B, tbl. 2, for a detailed breakdown of the responses to this
question.
101. Throughout this discussion percentages are rounded and based on the total
number of attorneys answering the particular question. See infra app. B, tbls. 2-8, for
more detail.
102. See infra app. B, tbl. 2. Regarding the value of peremptory challenges, 83% of
the prosecutors thought that peremptory challenges were of great value and 80% of the
defense attorneys thought they were of great value. Similarly, 82% of the state court
practitioners thought they were of great value, and 83% of the lawyers who had
practiced in both federal and state courts thought they were of great value. In contrast,
only 56% of the federal court practitioners thought that they were of great value. The
sample of exclusively federal court practitioners was small, however, and the balance




Survey respondents additionally observed that peremptory
challenges allow litigants some control over the composition of
the jury because they allow litigants to exclude jurors on the
basis of unprotected group membership (e.g., occupation), to
skew the panel in the client's favor by excluding panelists in
the opponent's favor, and to exclude the "screwballs" (the
quirky, unpredictable jurors). Finally, prosecutors, who must
obtain a unanimous verdict, find peremptory challenges valu-
able to shape a working group of jurors. Lawyers indicating
that peremptory challenges were only of some value often
commented that time (and other) limits on the examination of
the panelists limited the lawyer's ability to discover biases.103
While the lawyers responding to the survey acknowledged that
peremptory challenges were valuable, they also felt that peremp-
tory challenges had depreciated in value following Batson and
Wheeler. Of the lawyers who answered the question whether
peremptory challenges were of any more value before Batson or
Wheeler, 57% said that they were equally valuable, 23% said
that they had been slightly more valuable, and 16% said that
they had been significantly more valuable. Only 5% said that
they had been less valuable prior to Batson and Wheeler.
10 4
The lawyers who had practiced pre-Batson or pre-Wheeler
answered differently, however, attributing more value to the
pre-Batson and pre-Wheeler peremptory challenge. Of the law-
yers practicing before Batson in federal courts, only 42% thought
that peremptory challenges were equally valuable today, 37%
thought that pre-Batson peremptory challenges had been
slightly more valuable, and 11% thought that they had been
significantly more valuable.'0° Of the lawyers practicing pre-
Wheeler in state courts, 48% thought that peremptory challenges
were equally valuable today, 26% thought that they had been
slightly more valuable before Wheeler, and 22% thought that
they had been significantly more valuable prior to Wheeler.1'
Thus, 47% of the pre-Batson attorneys and 48% of the pre-
Wheeler attorneys believed that the peremptory challenge
depreciated in value following Batson and Wheeler, respectively,
but only 39% of the general population of surveyed attorneys
perceived a depreciation of the peremptory challenge.' 7
103. See survey responses (on file with author).
104. See infra app. B, tbls. 2, 3, for a detailed breakdown of the responses to this
set of questions.
105. See id. tbl. 3.
106. See id.
107. See id. The difference between pre-Wheeler and post-Wheeler attorneys reached
statistical significance. Attorneys who practiced before Wheeler were more likely to say
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The reasons cited by the lawyers for assigning a particular
value to pre-Batson and pre-Wheeler peremptory challenges were
telling. The survey respondents stated that, as a consequence
of Batson, a lawyer's discretion has been curtailed. That is,
before Batson the lawyer could challenge jurors on the basis of
race and sex (for example, "there is obviously a tendency for
people to sympathize with those from the same race"). After
Batson, however, even non-discriminatory challenges are chilled
if lawyers cannot explain them (as, for example, when the
lawyer bases the challenges on "gut feeling"). As another conse-
quence of Batson, lawyers are saddled with additional burdens.
For example, before Batson lawyers did not have to explain any
peremptory challenges, but after Batson lawyers must justify
their challenges and therefore must question the jurors more
extensively, take more notes during that questioning, and spend
more time comparing the responses of jurors.' °8
The primary reason cited by lawyers for why peremptory
challenges remain equally valuable today was that peremptory
challenge practice remains unchanged by Batson. The lawyers
observed that peremptory challenge practice remains unchanged
for two reasons: either because the lawyer has never exercised
a peremptory challenge on the basis of race or sex and is there-
fore unaffected by Batson's prohibition,0 9 or because Batson
motions are rarely granted and Batson therefore poses no
obstacle for lawyers who make race- and gender-based peremp-
tory challenges."0
Although the lawyers who practiced pre-Batson and pre-
Wheeler were more likely to believe that the value of the
peremptory challenge depreciated following Batson and Wheeler,
these lawyers described the current value of the peremptory
challenge in terms comparable to the general population of sur-
veyed lawyers. 1 ' Thus, the general population of lawyers value
that peremptory challenges had more value pre-Wheeler. The difference between defense
attorneys and prosecutors also reached statistical significance. Prosecutors were more
likely to say that peremptory challenges had more value pre-Batson and pre-Wheeler.
108. See survey responses (on file with author).
109. In particular, defense attorneys noted that they typically have no interest in
challenging panelists who belong to one of the cognizable groups. See id.
110. See survey responses (on file with author).
111. See infra app. B, tbls. 2, 3. Of the lawyers practicing pre-Batson, 83% thought
that peremptory challenges were of great value, 13% thought that they were of some
value, and only 4% thought that they were of no value. Of the lawyers practicing pre-
Wheeler, 80% thought that peremptory challenges were of great value and 20% thought
that they were of some value. None thought that they were of no value. By comparison,
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the current peremptory challenge highly, as do lawyers who cur-
rently practice and also practiced pre-Batson and pre-Wheeler.
Lawyers who practiced pre-Batson and pre-Wheeler continue to
value the peremptory challenge despite the constitutional limits
placed on the challenge. This fact is particularly significant
given that at least the state court practitioners have been living
with Wheeler since 1978, and these lawyers would therefore
have substantial experience with the limits that Wheeler and its
progeny impose on jury selection. Moreover, that the post-Batson
peremptory challenge remains valuable to trial lawyers dis-
proves the Batson critics' more extreme claims: Batson has not
forced the peremptory challenge to collapse into the challenge
for cause and has not effectively abolished the peremptory
challenge.
11 2
The surveyed trial lawyers nevertheless identified some
problems with the usefulness of peremptory challenges. In
particular, they noted inadequate questioning of the jury panel-
ists before the lawyers are called upon to exercise their peremp-
tory challenges as a problem. Of the lawyers answering the
question regarding the adequacy of voir dire, 28% thought that
questioning was never adequate and 56% thought that it was
only sometimes adequate." 3 Prosecutors and defense attorneys
agreed that inadequate questioning was a problem." 4 These
survey results indicate that the post-Batson peremptory chal-
lenge retains great value for trial lawyers. For reasons unrelated
to Batson, however, such as various limits on voir dire, the
peremptory challenge works less well than it could in identifying
jury panelist bias.
4. Batson Procedures Do Not Unduly Burden the Courts-
Apart from erroneous assertions about what Batson does to the
peremptory challenge, some of the Justices have condemned
Batson for what it does to the justice system by prolonging
trials." 5 Accordingly, the survey considered the burden associat-
ed with the implementation of Batson and its progeny.
81% of the general population of lawyers thought that peremptory challenges were of
great value, and 18% thought they were of some value.
112. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
113. See infra app. B, tbl. 4, for a detailed breakdown of the responses to this
question.
114. See id. Only 20% of the prosecutors thought that voir dire was never adequate,
however 37% of the defense attorneys thought that it was never adequate. The difference
between prosecutors and defense attorneys reached statistical significance. Defense
attorneys were more likely to say that voir dire was inadequate.
115. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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According to the surveyed trial lawyers, Batson and Wheeler
are not often invoked," 6 and when they are, the motions do not
take up too much court time."7 When asked how often Batson
or Wheeler motions were made by the attorney, co-counsel, or
the opposition attorney in cases personally tried by the attorney,
only 1% of the surveyed lawyers said that such motions were
made in all cases and 5% said that such motions were made in
most cases. Notably, 68% said that such motions were made in
only some cases, and an additional 26% said that they were
never made. Moreover, prosecutors and defense attorneys basic-
ally shared this view.
18
When asked ifBatson/Wheeler motions take up too much court
time, 87% of the surveyed attorneys thought that they did not,
and 13% thought that they did. Interestingly, prosecutors and
defense attorneys answered this question somewhat differently.
Of prosecutors, 75% thought that these motions did not take up
too much court time, and 25% thought that they did. In contrast,
98% of defense attorneys thought that these motions did not
take up too much court time, and only 2% thought that they
did." 9 The difference between prosecutors and defense attorneys
may be attributable to the fact that defense attorneys bring
these motions more often than prosecutors. 120 Defense attorneys
116. For a detailed breakdown of the responses to this question, see infra app. B,
tbl. 5.
117. See id. tbl. 6, for a detailed breakdown of the responses to this question.
118. See id. tbl. 5. Prosecutors shared the view of the general population of lawyers:
1% said that Batson or Wheeler motions were made in all cases, 7% said that they were
made in most cases, 57% said that they were made in only some cases, and 34% said
that they were made in no cases. Defense attorneys arguably perceived more motion
activity: 1% said that such motions were made in all cases, 2% said that they were made
in most cases, 80% said that they were made in some cases, and only 17% said that they
were made in no cases.
119. The difference between prosecutors and defense attorneys reached statistical
significance. Prosecutors were more likely to say that Batson/Wheeler motions took up
too much court time.
The difference between lawyers practicing pre- and post-Batson in federal courts also
reached statistical significance. Lawyers with pre-Batson experience were more likely
to say that the motions took up too much court time. Notably, however, the difference
between lawyers practicing pre- and post-Wheeler in state courts did not reach statistical
significance, although it was close. Of the pre-Wheeler attorneys, 20% thought that the
motions took up too much court time, but only 9% of the post-Wheeler attorneys thought
so. See infra app. B, tbl. 6. Perhaps examination of a larger pre- and post-Batson pool
of attorneys similarly would fail to reach statistical significance.
120. See Melilli, supra note 24, at 457-59 (demonstrating that Batson is invoked
almost exclusively by criminal defendants); see also DIPERNA, supra note 3, at 154
(observing that pre-Batson protests to race-based peremptory challenges were "mostly
defense complaints objecting to prosecutorial behavior" and that "peremptory challenge
abuse [was] most widespread among, though not confined to, prosecutors").
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who make these motions would be unlikely to think (or admit)
that they burden the system. In any event, three out of four
prosecutors agreed that the motions do not take up too much
court time.
B. Assessing Batson's Effectiveness in Eradicating
Unlawful Discrimination in Jury Selection
According to the survey, then, Batson does not unduly burden
the courts. Although this may be true, Batson may not be partic-
ularly effective either. If it were wholly or even grossly ineffec-
tive in eradicating unlawful discrimination injury selection, any
burden on the courts would be unjustified, and alternatives to
Batson would have to be considered.
Justice Marshall, concurring in Batson, predicted that the
Court's decision would not end race discrimination in jury
selection primarily because a trial court would have difficulty
assessing a lawyer's motives in excluding the subject jury
panelist(s).'21 Many legal scholars and commentators have
echoed Justice Marshall's concerns, 122 and empirical evidence
supports his prediction that lawyers would proffer lame excuses
121. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-07 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
122. See Deborah L. Forman, What Difference Does It Make? Gender and Jury
Selection, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 59-64 (1992) (discussing the problem of pretextual
explanations); Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Rein-
forcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1830-31 (1993) (observing
that Batson "invites any inventive prosecutor to create subterfuges"); Jere W. Morehead,
When a Peremptory Challenge is No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure
to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination from Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 633
(1994) (observing that Batson cannot prevent 'clever lawyers" from engaging in unlawful
discrimination in jury selection); Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory
Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 44-47 (1988) (observing that "any thoughtful prosecutor can
sufficiently disguise racial discrimination with racially-neutral reasons"); Karen M. Bray,
Comment, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA
L. REV. 517, 543 (1992) (describing "rubber stamp" approvals of explanations that
thereby "cripple" Batson); Stacy A. Dowling, Note, Equal Protection Clause Prohibits
Litigants from Exercising Peremptory Challenges on the Basis of Gender-J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994), 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 756, 786 (1994)
(arguing that Batson is rendered 'meaningless" by the litigant's ability to "mask the real
reasons for their strikes"); Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's Invidious Legacy: Discrimina-
tory Jury Exclusion and the 'Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 336,
362-63 (1993) (observing that Batson is "little more than a test of the prosecutor's
creativity"); Widder, supra note 48, at 2326-27 (describing Batson as nothing more than
a "symbolic denunciation of racial discrimination by lawyers").
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for prima facie discriminatory challenges and that courts would
accept them. For instance, a study examining 824 cases, pri-
marily appellate court opinions, applying the Batson procedures
in the first five years after Batson, concluded that a prosecutor
who wanted to rebut a prima facie case of illegal discrimination
in jury selection did not face a significant challenge.'23 Other
case studies have reached the same conclusion.'24 Indeed, one
study concerned with pretextual explanations for prima facie
discriminatory peremptory challenges sarcastically asks, "Is
everything race neutral?"
125
The impressions of trial lawyers in the survey generally
confirmed the conclusions of these studies. Lawyers in the
survey were only moderately impressed with the ability of
Batson and Wheeler to prevent unlawful discrimination, 26 noting
that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination was difficult
to establish and easy to rebut. 2 v Again, prosecutors and defense
123. See Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral
Explanations under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 229, 235 (1993).
124. See Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection, and Jury Selection:
Denying that Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 511, 583-96 (using the reported
decisions of the lower federal courts to demonstrate that these courts rarely find Batson
violations and overwhelmingly accept proffered neutral reasons); Eric N. Einhorn, Note,
Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Is the Peremptory Challenge Still
Preeminent? 36 B.C. L. REV. 161, 187-96 (1994) (reviewing federal appellate court
decisions and discussing the proffering of neutral explanations with skepticism); Swift,
supra note 122, at 357-61 (surveying federal appellate court decisions and concluding
that "soft-data" reasons, such as posture, are impossible to evaluate).
Somewhat in contrast, Professor Melilli has demonstrated that almost four out of five
times a lawyer facing a Batson challenge successfully offers a neutral explanation, but
he concludes that this success rate is "not so high as to suggest that the courts merely
rubber stamp virtually all such explanations as satisfactory." Melilli, supra note 24, at
465. Professor Melilli admits, however, that in certain jurisdictions, a much stronger
case can be made that courts routinely accept pretextual explanations. See id. at 470.
125. Brand, supra note 124, at 591. One legal commentator has hypothesized that
trial courts accept weak explanations for peremptories because they do not carefully
scrutinize the prima facie case, which often is weak. In other words, "weak explanations
are all that is needed to rebut weak inferences of discrimination." Diprima, supra note
75, at 914. This commentator argues that trial courts must scrutinize more carefully
the prima facie case and recommends statistical decision theory to analyze the numeric
evidence of discrimination. See id. at 914-15.
126. For example, 65% of the lawyers thought that Batson and Wheeler only
sometimes prevented unlawful discrimination. Another 15% thought that they never
prevented unlawful discrimination. Only 20% thought that they usually prevented
unlawful discrimination. See infra app. B, tbl. 7, for a more detailed breakdown of the
responses to this question.
127. Not surprisingly, 45% of the lawyers thought that it was somewhat difficult to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, 23% thought that it was very difficult,
23% thought that it was easy to establish a prima facie case, and only 9% thought that
it was very easy.
Similarly, 50% of the lawyers thought that it was easy to rebut a prima facie case
of discrimination, 14% thought that it was very easy, 23% thought that it was somewhat
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attorneys responded to these questions somewhat differently.
Defense attorneys apparently were more cynical about the
effectiveness of Batson and Wheeler 128 and about the ability to
establish a case of unlawful discrimination. 129 Again this diver-
gence of opinion between prosecutors and defense attorneys may
stem from the fact that defense attorneys make Batson and
Wheeler motions more frequently than prosecutors. 3 ° Because
they make these motions more often, defense attorneys would
be more conscious of and sensitive to the difficulty in establish-
ing these claims.
When asked why Batson/Wheeler motions do or do not prevent
unlawful discrimination injury selection, some of the more skep-
tical lawyers indicated that in order to win a Batson/Wheeler
motion the discrimination must be flagrant (i.e., the motions are
never granted). Batson and Wheeler motions are difficult to win
because lawyers rebutting a prima facie case of discrimination
may not tell the truth, and the rebutting lawyer can too easily
come up with a race-neutral reason for the challenge (i.e.,
counsel can use the most subjective justifications for excusing
a juror, such as body language or poor eye contact-basically,
the attorney who discriminates by exercising the challenge has
to be an idiot to get caught). Similarly, lawyers can get away
with discrimination if they accept even one minority (i.e., Batson
only limits what either side can get away with); and if only one
difficult, and 13% thought that it was very difficult. See infra app. B, tbl. 8, for a more
detailed breakdown of the responses to this question.
128. Ofthe responding defense attorneys, only 13% thought that Batson and Wheeler
usually prevented unlawful discrimination in jury selection, 75% thought that they
sometimes prevented unlawful discrimination, and 13% thought that they never
prevented it. In contrast, of the responding prosecutors, 28% thought that Batson and
Wheeler usually prevented unlawful discrimination, 55% thought that they sometimes
prevented unlawful discrimination, and 17% thought that they never prevented it. See
id.
129. Of the responding defense attorneys, 40% thought that it was very difficult to
establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination in jury selection, 41% thought
that it was somewhat difficult, 15% thought that it was easy, and only 5% thought that
it was very easy. See id. In contrast, of the responding prosecutors, only 7% thought that
it was very difficult, and 50% thought that it was somewhat difficult, while 29% thought
that it was easy, and 14% thought that it was very easy. See id.
In terms of rebutting a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, 48% of the
defense attorneys thought that it was easy, 21% thought that it was very easy, 14%
thought that it was somewhat difficult, and 17% thought that it was very difficult. See
id. Among prosecutors, however, 51% thought that rebutting a prima facie case of
unlawful discrimination was easy, but only 8% thought that it was very easy. Another
33% thought that it was somewhat difficult, and 8% thought that it was very difficult.
See id.
130. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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or two members of a cognizable group are panelists, which is
often the case, it is almost impossible to show a pattern or
practice of excluding the group.'31 Survey respondents addition-
ally noted that efficiency concerns come into play when the trial
court accepts specious grounds for challenge to avoid losing time
by summoning a new panel. Some prosecutors also commented
that defense counsel sometimes use the motions strategically,
to embarrass the prosecutor or to prevent the loss of a juror
biased in the defendant's favor.
More optimistic lawyers indicated that attorneys and judges
are sensitive to the issue of discrimination in jury selection;
lawyers know what they can and cannot do and comply with the
law. Some thought that Batson and Wheeler deter "knee-jerk"
challenges based on stereotypes because lawyers know that they
mustjustify their challenges. In addition, offending lawyers face
the prospect of various sanctions that serve as deterrents: their
misconduct may be reported in the press, they may be labeled
racists, and they may face contempt proceedings.
The survey thus gives us some insight into the more dis-
turbing findings of the case studies.'32 Batson and its progeny
may have transformed jury selection practice by educating
responsible attorneys about race and gender discrimination in
jury selection. Batson and its progeny may also function as a
prophylactic, chilling the discriminatory jury selection practices
of trial attorneys who fear the sanctions associated with Batson
violations.'33 Although the narrative responses of trial lawyers
in the study suggest both effects, the case studies simply do not
tell us about the number of unlawful peremptory challenges that
Batson has prevented-discriminatory challenges that might
have been made pre-Batson. Nor do they tell us about the
131. One method of proving a prima facie case of discrimination is to show that a
party has challenged most or all of the members of a cognizable group. See People v.
Motton, 704 P.2d 176, 182 (Cal. 1985) (en banc); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 764
(Cal. 1978); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (noting that a "pattern"
of strikes may give rise to an inference of discrimination). For a discussion and critique
of the "numbers game" in raising the inference of discrimination in jury selection, see
Serr & Maney, supra note 122, at 27-37.
132. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
133. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 172 (optimistically arguing that "most prose-
cutors probably will comply with [Batson] in good faith"); Cammack, supra note 48, at
455 (positing that "[m]ost attorneys probably take the prohibition against race- or
gender-based peremptories seriously"); Herman, supra note 122, at 1834 (assuming some
prophylactic effect); Underwood, supra note 15, at 769 (reporting that informal




number of cases in which Batson motions have been granted by
the trial courts. What the case studies do tell us is that Batson's
requirement of articulating a neutral explanation for suspect
peremptory challenges creates no substantial hurdle for" 'those
... who are of a mind to discriminate,' , 134 let alone for those
who discriminate unconsciously. 135 The survey results support
this conclusion by demonstrating that many practicing lawyers
believe that Batson does not effectively prevent unlawful dis-
crimination. So, although Batson appears to play some role in
preventing unlawful discrimination in jury selection, specific
Batson procedures may be ineffective in identifying that dis-
crimination once it occurs.
C. Proposed Alternatives to Batson
Perceiving that Batson and its progeny have failed to eradi-
cate unlawful discrimination in jury selection, many scholars
and commentators have advocated the elimination of peremp-
tory challenges. 136 The overwhelming weight of professional
sentiment, however, supports retaining them.'37
In response to the question regarding whether peremptory
challenges should be eliminated from the jury selection pro-
cess, '3 98% of the attorneys who answered the question said
134. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
135. See Brand, supra note 124, at 611-13. For the seminal article on how equal
protection analysis fails to account for unconscious racism, see Charles R. Lawrence III,
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 317 (1987).
136. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 209 (underscoring the gains from elimination:
substantial economic savings and effective control of illegal discrimination); Amar,
supra note 3, at 1182 (arguing that "[jiuries should represent the people, not the
parties"); Cammack, supra note 48, at 486 (observing that elimination of peremptory
challenges would increase diversity on juries); Marder, supra note 3, at 1052-53, 1136
(emphasizing the public roles that a jury performs); Morehead, supra note 122, at
632-37 (asserting that Batson accomplishes too little and costs too much); Bray, supra
note 122, at 555 (arguing that the costs of Batson outweigh the benefits); Dowling,
supra note 122, at 785 (underscoring the costs of implementing Batson and its lack of
benefits); Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1472, 1582 (1988) (assuming, however, that the elimination of peremptory
challenges would apply only to the prosecution's exercise of such challenges); see also
Massaro, supra note 4, at 504 (advocating, before Batson, the elimination of govern-
ment peremptory challenges).
137. See infra app. B, tbl. 9.
138. See infra app. B, tbl. 9, for a detailed breakdown of the responses to this
question.
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that peremptory challenges should not be eliminated.'39 Only
2% thought that they should be eliminated. Significantly, the
lawyers who practiced pre-Batson and pre-Wheeler also opposed
the elimination of the peremptory challenge in numbers compa-
rable to the general population of surveyed lawyers. 4 °
The reasons cited by the lawyers for retaining peremptory
challenges mirrored their reasons for why peremptory chal-
lenges were valuable to them: peremptory challenges allowed
them to assemble a fair jury because they could eliminate
predisposed jurors and weed out unreceptive jurors. Peremp-
tory challenges prevented hung juries because the attorney
could consider group dynamics in making his or her challenges.
In addition, peremptory challenges provided for attorney and
party control of jury selection, and thereby validated jury
verdicts. Notably, none of the lawyers commented that per-
emptory challenges should be eliminated to prevent unlawful
discrimination in jury selection. One lawyer noted, however,
that peremptory challenges should not be eliminated merely
because some lawyers use them to discriminate illegally. An-
other commented that they actually were necessary to prevent
discrimination. 141
139. Prosecutors and defense attorneys alike shared this sentiment, as did state
court and federal court practitioners. Ninety-nine percent of the prosecutors, 99% of the
defense attorneys, 99% of state court practitioners, 94% of the lawyers who practiced
in both federal and state courts, and 100% of the federal court practitioners thought
peremptory challenges should not be eliminated. See id.
140. See id. Of the lawyers practicing pre-Batson, 91% opposed the elimination of
the peremptory challenge. Only 9% thought that peremptory challenges should be
eliminated. Of the lawyers practicing pre-Wheeler, 97% thought that peremptory
challenges should not be eliminated. Only 3% thought that the peremptory challenge
should be eliminated.
141. See survey responses (on file with author). Various legal scholars have empha-
sized the problem of conscious and unconscious juror racism directed toward the
criminal defendant. See Herman, supra note 122, at 1814-15 (expressing concern about
the Court's increasing emphasis on the rights of excluded jurors and decreasing
attention to the rights of defendants and the problem of prejudice); Sheri Lynn
Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not To Say Race) of Peremptory Challenges, 35
WM. & MARY. L. REV. 21, 22-23 (1993) (arguing that a criminal defendant's right to a
racially unbiased jury verdict should be the primary focus of equal protection jurispru-
dence in the context of jury selection); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note
23, at 240-49 (criticizing the use of Batson to protect potential jurors and arguing that
the greatest potential for injustice lies with a defendant facing a racially biased jury);
Widder, supra note 48, at 2312, 2331-32 (discussing the problem of the racist jury and
advocating a defendant-oriented approach to jury selection that focuses on the composi-
tion of the jury actually empaneled). But see Underwood, supra note 15, at 726-50
(arguing that "the fundamental injury inflicted by race discrimination in jury selection
is its effect on the excluded jurors" and not its effect on the criminal defendant).
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Given the opposition of trial lawyers to the elimination of the
peremptory challenge,'42 and the fact that "nothing ... in the
Batson line suggests that the Court is actually likely to abolish
the peremptory challenge soon,"' legal scholars and commenta-
tors have considered various alternatives to simply eliminating
the peremptory challenge. For example, some legal scholars and
commentators have argued for reducing the number of peremp-
tory challenges allowed, primarily to encourage the more
responsible exercise of the peremptory challenge.'44 Some have
argued for eliminating peremptory challenges but expanding
challenges for cause, presumably minimizing the loss of the
peremptory challenge by allowing litigants to exclude jury
panelists for legitimate, articulated reasons that ordinarily
would not satisfy the stringent standards of challenges for
cause.'45 Others propose more effectively deterring Batson
violations by aggressively punishing such violations with dis-
missal of the case, contempt citations, censure, reprimand,
removal from the courtroom, temporary suspension from prac-
tice in the courtroom, referral to appropriate disciplinary
bodies, or identification and admonition in published judicial
142. For a discussion of trial lawyer resistance to peremptory challenge reform, see
William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 1987
SUP. CT. REv. 97, 150-51.
143. Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal To Eliminate Racially Discrimi-
natory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1099, 1132 (1994). But see
Minetos v. City University of New York, 925 F. Supp. 177, 185 (S.D. N.Y. 1996) (holding
that peremptory challenges per se violate equal protection).
144. See, e.g., Morehead, supra note 122, at 640 (suggesting that each party be
allowed only one or two peremptory challenges, but advancing that idea as a fallback
position to complete elimination); Ogletree, supra note 143, at 1148 (advocating the
reduction of prosecution peremptories to one or two if asymmetrical abolition of
peremptories proved politically unfeasible); Pizzi, supra note 142, at 148-49 (suggesting
that a sharp reduction in the number of peremptory challenges be coupled with
expanded challenges for cause or limited trial court discretion to grant additional
peremptories in cases involving an unusual problem of possible prejudice); Pam
Frasher, Note, Fulfilling Batson and its Progeny: A Proposed Amendment to Rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to Attain a More Race- and Gender-Neutral
Jury Selection Process, 80 IowA L. REv. 1327, 1330-31, 1347 (1995) (recommending a
reduction in the number of peremptory challenges allowed in combination with
expanded voir dire); see also Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 21, at 376-77 (criticizing
Batson-type limits on the exercise of peremptory challenges, but suggesting that
reducing the number of peremptory challenges available to each side would encourage
the responsible use of those challenges).
145. See, e.g., Marder, supra note 3, at 1107-14; Morehead, supra note 122, at
640-41; Ogletree, supra note 143, at 1148 (arguing for the elimination of peremptory
challenges for prosecutors and civil litigators only, but expanding their challenges for
cause); Bray, supra note 122, at 557-58 (suggesting the expansion of challenges for
cause in combination with liberalization of voir dire).
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opinions. 146 Others advocate expanding voir dire so that liti-
gants have information other than simple stereotypes upon
which to base their challenges. 147 Some suggest more critically
evaluating neutral explanations to prevent unlawful discrimina-
tion. 14 Still others propose utilizing affirmative selection proce-
dures, which allow litigants to have some say in who is on the
jury and not simply some say in who is excluded. 49 Finally,
several commentators advocate employing race-and gender-
consciousness in jury selection to diversify juries. 5 °
146. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 143, at 1116-23.
147. See, e.g., id. at 1123-31 (favoring expanding voir dire in combination with
allowing both attorneys to participate in all phases of the Batson hearing); Bray, supra
note 122, at 557-58 (supporting expanded voir dire in combination with expanded
challenges for cause); Frasher, supra note 144, at 1347 (arguing for expanded voir dire
in combination with a reduction in the number of peremptory challenges allowed).
148. See, e.g., Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 123, at 267-68; Serr & Maney,
supra note 122, at 47-62; Swift, supra note 122, at 361-62. One idea advanced by
Raphael and Ungvarsky was to require the lawyers to submit their criteria for
dismissing jurors before the trial and before having any information about the identity
of the persons on the jury venire. See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 123, at
267-268, 271. The proposal is designed to prevent the tendering of pretextual expla-
nations for peremptory challenges.
149. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial
by Jury De Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV.
777, 806-08 (1994) (proposing a procedure in which the exercise of peremptory
challenges would follow the selection of a "relevant qualified venire," using a combina-
tion of random selection by the court and affirmative peremptory choices by the
litigants); Altman, supra note 49, at 806-11. Altman's particularly interesting proposal
requires both sides, having exercised their challenges for cause, to list, in order of
preference, 12 jurors. See id. at 806. The judge would first select any juror whose name
appeared on both lists, regardless of how the juror was ranked. See id. Then, alternat-
ing between the lists, the judge would take the highest-rated juror from each list until
a complete panel had been assembled. See id.
150. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704,
716-23 (1995) (advocating affirmative action in the distinct context ofjury selection);
Brand, supra note 124, at 627 (advocating the inclusion of jury panelists from groups
that have been historically oppressed); Forman, supra note 122, at 75-76 (advocating
gender-consciousness); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83
MICH. L. REv. 1611, 1695-99 (1985) (proposing that every African-American, Native-
American, Hispanic, and Asian-American defendant be entitled to the inclusion of three
'racially similar"jurors on a jury of 12); Lorrie L. Luellig, Why J.E.B. v. T.B. Will Fail
to Advance Equality: A Call for Discrimination in Jury Selection, 10 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J.
403, 455-56 (1995) (arguing that when dealing with "women-specific harms," courts
should allow the woman suffering the harm to exercise peremptory challenges to
exclude male jury panelists while requiring the opposing party to show cause to exclude
female jury panelists); Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the
Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 63, 69-70 (1993) (arguing that the
peremptory challenge of black jury panelists "should be prohibited whenever there is
a substantial likelihood that racial issues [will] impact the trial"); Widder, supra note
48, at 2331-33 (recommending that peremptory challenges be examined for their effect
on the heterogeneity of the jury).
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For the most part, the proposed alternatives focus on im-
proving the effectiveness of Batson, but not on improving the
effectiveness of the peremptory challenge. This focus results
because the problem of unlawful discrimination in jury selection
drives the various proposals. The survey indicates, however,
that the effectiveness of both Batson and the peremptory chal-
lenge are causes for concern. The effectiveness of the perempto-
ry challenge will only improve to the extent that litigants can
better identify and eliminate biased jury panelists. To the
extent that both Batson and the peremptory challenge are less
effective than they can and should be, reform efforts appropri-
ately consider how to improve the effectiveness of both.
Of the various alternatives identified above, only the rec-
ommendation to expand voir dire could improve the effective-
ness of the peremptory challenge in identifying and eliminating
biased jury panelists and improve the effectiveness of Batson in
eliminating illegal discrimination in jury selection. It theoreti-
cally would improve the effectiveness of the peremptory chal-
lenge because it would result in better informed and more
intelligent challenges.' 5 ' It theoretically would improve the
effectiveness of Batson because additional information about
individual jury panelists would mean that litigants would be
less likely to resort to illegal group-based assumptions in
exercising their peremptory challenges.'52 Nevertheless, the
recommendation to expand voir dire is unlikely to be economi-
cally or politically feasible in the context of costly live voir
dire.' 53
151. A study of the effect of peremptory challenges on jury verdicts found that voir
dire "did not provide sufficient information for attorneys to identify prejudiced jur[y
panelists]." Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges
on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491,
528 (1978). Although defense attorneys performed slightly better than prosecutors in
identifying prejudiced jury panelists, "[tihe collective performance of the attorneys [wals
not impressive." Id. at 517. Accordingly, the researchers identified a need to "increase
the amount of information on which lawyers base their decisions." Id. at 529. See also
VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 77 (1986) (observing that research
findings indicate that with limited voir dire lawyers are generally ineffective in
uncovering bias).
152. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 US. 127, 143 (1994) (observing that properly
conducted voir dire makes reliance on "stereotypical and pejorative notions about a
particular gender or race both unnecessary and unwise"); see also Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991) (observing that "[o]ther means exist for
litigants to satisfy themselves of a jury's impartiality without using skin color as a test"
and advising litigants to explore bias in a "rational way").
153. See Forman supra note 122, at 71 (noting a trend to curtail voir dire);
Morehead, supra note 122, at 636-37 (describing the voir dire required by Batson
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For some time now, voir dire has come under attack as too
time-consuming and expensive.154 As a result, courts and leg-
islatures have imposed restrictions on voir dire. Many jur-
isdictions have replaced attorney-conducted voir dire with
judge-conducted voir dire. 155 When attorney-conducted voir dire
is allowed, severe time constraints are often imposed.'56
In addition, regardless of who conducts the voir dire, much
modern voir dire involves directing questions to the entire panel
rather than to individual jury panelists.'57 Even when jury
panelists are examined individually, they are usually examined
in the presence of other jurors.'5 8 These circumstances foster
conformity in juror responses:
In such situations the willingness of jurors to give an an-
swer contrary to what has previously been given by other
members of the group (either in terms of the content of the
responses or the breaking of silence during group question-
ing) is diminished, particularly if such disclosures would
potentially lead to negative evaluations of them.'59
jurisprudence as too time-consuming and expensive); Pizzi, supra note 142, at 140
(describing Batson and the "pressure" it creates to conduct more extensive questioning
ofjury panelists as a "step in the wrong direction as far as the efficiency of the system
is concerned"); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 23, at 248 n.72 (noting
the administrative burden of voir dire); see also Massaro, supra note 4, at 527-29
(demonstrating that the Court has provided little protection for voir dire). But see V.
HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION § 10.0.4 (2d ed. 1993) (observing
a trend toward concern for obtaining a more complete voir dire).
154. See Babcock, supra note 21, at 545 & n.2.
155. See id. at 548. Judge-conducted voir dire predominates in the federal courts.
See DIPERNA, supra note 3, at 91; STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 153, § 10.0.1;
Diprima, supra note 75, at 893. It is also popular in the state courts. In 1990, California
voters passed Proposition 115, which made voir dire conducted by a judge (as opposed
to an attorney) mandatory in state criminal trials absent a showing of good cause. See
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 223 (West Supp. 1996). It also limited examination of the
panelists to questions going to challenges for cause and prohibited questions going to
peremptory challenges. See id. Other jurisdictions providing for judge-conducted voir
dire are the following: Arizona, Delaware, District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania.
DAVID B. ROTTMAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 1993 tbl. 36,
269-73 (1995). In addition, some states provide for judge-conducted voir dire, but allow
the judge to invite attorney participation. These states include Illinois, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, and New Jersey. See id. Finally, New Hampshire allows counsel to propose
voir dire questions, especially in murder cases, though the judge still conducts the voir
dire. See id.
156. See Babcock, supra note 21, at 546.
157. See id. at 547.
158. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 223 (West Supp. 1996).
159. JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN JURY § 5-202
(1987). See also Babcock, supra note 21, at 547.
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The attorney survey offers some insight into the problem of
restricted voir dire. When asked how the jury panelists were
usually questioned, 59% of the lawyers said that they were
usually questioned only by the court, and 29% said by counsel
and the court.160 Defense lawyers seemed to perceive more
court domination of voir dire as 64% indicated that the court
alone questioned the jury panelists, and only 54% of the prose-
cutors indicated that the court alone questioned the jury panel-
ists.
When asked what, if anything, interfered with the adequate
questioning of the jury panelists, the lawyers overwhelmingly
concurred that judge- (as opposed to attorney-) conducted voir
dire explained the inadequate questioning of the venire. Specif-
ically, the lawyers commented that judges limit questioning to
demographics, ask closed-ended questions eliciting little infor-
mation, fail to ask obvious follow-up questions, and know little
or nothing about the issues important to each side. Moreover,
judges apparently refuse to ask questions proposed by the
attorneys. Several lawyers attributed the inadequacy of judge-
conducted voir dire to judicial apathy and laziness. Others
believed that judges were more concerned about efficiency
than justice. The lawyers also noted that the dishonesty of the
jury panelists contributed to the inadequacy of voir dire.
161
Any proposal to improve both the effectiveness of the peremp-
tory challenge and Batson must address these concerns.
III. VOIR DIRE BY QUESTIONNAIRE AND THE
"BLIND" PEREMPTORY: A PROPOSAL
This Article proposes a system of "blind" peremptories. The
proposal is simple: allow the usual number of alternating
peremptory challenges and allow complete questioning of the
jury panelists, but allow only voir dire by questionnaire and the
exercise of "blind" peremptories. In a system of blind
peremptories, jury panelists would be identified by numbers
and not their names, and no questions regarding cognizable
group status (such as race, ethnicity, or sex) would be
160. See infra app. B, tbl. 10, for a detailed breakdown of the responses to this
question.
161. See survey responses (on file with author).
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permitted.'62 Jury panelists would be questioned by question-
naire rather than in open court.'l 3 Lawyers would base their pe-
remptory challenges on a panelist's written answers and would
exercise them blindly-that is, without the opportunity to
confront the jury panelists in person.
A. The Proposal Would Effectively Address the
Problems Inherent in the Current Peremptory
Challenge System and Batson
A system of blind peremptories would improve the effective-
ness of the peremptory challenge in eliminating biased jurors.
Although none of the surveyed trial lawyers had experience
with voir dire by questionnaire only, 64 questionnaires are
becoming more common tools in jury selection,'165 and at least
11% of the surveyed trial attorneys had some experience with
voir dire by questionnaire. 166 Voir dire by questionnaire would
allow fuller, more meaningful, attorney-conducted voir dire
(attorney-conducted because the parties and not the court would
draft the questionnaire). Questionnaires also have the advan-
tage of allowing for individualized questioning outside the pres-
ence of other jurors (individualized because each jury panelist
162. The proposed procedure should be distinguished from the selection of an
anonymous jury. In some cases, primarily organized crime cases, attorneys select ajury
from a panel of prospective jurors whose names, addresses, and perhaps other personal
information, remain unknown to the parties. See Eric Wertheim, Note, Anonymous
Juries, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 981, 982 (1986) (describing an anonymous jury). The
procedure is "designed to protect jurors from outside influence and the fear of retalia-
tion." Id. Voir dire by questionnaire to prevent unlawful discrimination injury selection
does not implicate the defendant's presumption of innocence. Cf id. at 985-97 (assess-
ing the effect of using an anonymous jury on a defendant's presumption of innocence).
Nor does it implicate the media's right of access to information the same way that the
use of an anonymous jury does. See Marc 0. Litt, 'Citizen-Soldiers" or Anonymous
Justice: Reconciling the Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, the First Amendment
Right of the Media and the Privacy Right of Jurors, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 371,
373-74 (1992) (discussing media access to the names and addresses of jurors and
arguing that "anonymous justice should be tolerated only in the rarest of cases"). Upon
completion of jury selection, the jurors' identities ordinarily would be revealed.
163. Completed questionnaires would be available to the press and public, as well
as to the parties.
164. See infra app. B, tbl. 10.
165. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 153, §§ 2.8, 10.0.1, 11.5.1.
166. See infra app. B, tbl. 10.
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completes a separate questionnaire), 16 reducing the embarrass-
ment of speaking publicly, reducing the embarrassment of
admitting bias, eliminating the pressure to conform one's
answers to the answers of other panelists, and eliminating the
risk that one jury panelist's prejudicial remarks will influence
the balance of the panel. 168 The blind peremptory, coupled with
complete examination of the panelists by questionnaire, thus
frees the litigant to exercise more principled peremptory chal-
lenges. Because the jury panelists would complete their
questionnaires simultaneously and counsel could review the
completed questionnaires while the trial court attended to other
matters, it would also save trial courts the time and resources
required for live voir dire.
A system of blind peremptories would also improve the
effectiveness of Batson in eliminating unlawful discrimination
in jury selection. In their study of 824 cases applying Batson,
Raphael and Ungvarsky observed that proffered explanations
for prima facie discriminatory peremptory challenges fell into
twelve categories: age, occupation, unemployment, religion,
demeanor, relationship with a trial participant, lack of "intel-
ligence," socioeconomic status, residence, marital status, previ-
ous involvement with the criminal justice system, and jury
experience.169 These explanations typically served to rebut the
prima facie case of discrimination, 7 ° except, perhaps, when
white jury panelists with characteristics similar to the excluded
panelists were not also excluded.' 7 ' Raphael and Ungvarsky
believe that proffered explanations are often suspect and that
courts need to scrutinize these explanations for pretext more
thoroughly.'72 Because litigants would not have the opportunity
to examine jury panelists visually or orally, blind peremptories
would eliminate the more subjective, pretextual explanations
based on demeanor,'73 voice, and appearance, such as no eye
167. Individual questioning ofjurors outside the presence of other jurors has been
identified as the best method of discovering juror bias. See FREDERICK, supra note 159,
§ 5-201; HANs & VIDMAR, supra note 151, at 71-72; Developments in the Law--Race and
the Criminal Process, supra note 136, at 1584.
168. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 153, §§ 11.5.2, 11.6.3 (detailing the benefits
of using questionnaires and approving of their use in conjunction with live voir dire).
169. See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 123, at 237-66.
170. See id. at 238.
171. See id. at 239, 243, 254, 260-61, 264.
172. See id. at 266-67.
173. See id. at 246 (observing that juror demeanor was an "extremely frequent"
proffered explanation in their study and the most subjective of the recurring, arguably
pretextual explanations).
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contact, staring, body language, accent, hair style, and dress.
Blind peremptories would also eliminate pretextual explana-
tions based on categories not closely linked to race or gender,
such as age, unemployment, relationship with a trial partici-
pant, intelligence, socioeconomic status, marital status, previous
involvement with the criminal justice system, and prior jury
experience. Even the lawyer intent on discriminating would not
know whether the eighty-year-old jury panelist was black or
white, male or female. Although it would not eliminate
pretextual explanations closely linked to race or gender, like
occupation, 174 religion,'75 and residence,'76 a system of blind
peremptories would make peremptory challenges based on these
sorts of categories less valuable and more of a gamble for
"'those ... who are of a mind to discriminate."" 77 The lawyer
simply would not know for sure the race or gender .of the
prospective juror (e.g., the juror could be a male nurse or a
woman with military experience). 7 Thus, the blind peremptory
prevents unlawful discrimination in jury selection by limiting
the ability of the litigants to discern the race and gender of the
jury panelists. 79 To the extent that unlawful discrimination in
174. Occupations are often associated with gender. For example, clerical work,
homemaking, nursing, and elementary school teaching are occupations often associated
with women. Data may support a litigant's belief that a panelist in one of these
occupations is likely to be female.
175. Religion is sometimes associated with race. Buddhism, Hinduism, and the
American Nation of Islam, for instance, are religions associated with race. Nevertheless,
if religion-based peremptory challenges offend Batson-and they probably do, see supra
note 15,-under a system ofvoir dire by questionnaire and blind peremptories, inquiries
into a jury panelist's religion would be prohibited.
176. Race is often linked to residence since housing segregation continues in modern
America. For example, a litigant may rationally conclude that a panelist from East Los
Angeles is likely to be Mexican-American.
For a discussion of black and Hispanic segregation in the metropolitan United
States, see Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropol-
itan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation Along Five Dimensions, 26 DEMOGRAPHY
373 (1989).
177. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559, 562 (1953)).
178. See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 21, at 365 (discussing the opportunity costs
of challenging jurors on the basis of questionable stereotypes).
179. A jury panelist's sex may be discernible from the panelist's handwriting.
Handwriting experts, known as graphologists, assert that sex cannot be reliably
determined from handwriting, see STEPHEN KURDSEN, GRAPHOLOGY: THE NEW SCIENCE
11 (1971); BETTY LINK, ADVANCED GRAPHOLOGY 15 (1986); NADYA OLYANOVA, HAND-
WRITING TELLS 136 (1969); DOROTHY SARA, HANDWRITING ANALYSIS 15 (1956), but
studies indicate that experts and lay persons do better than chance in identifying an
author's sex from the author's handwriting. These studies demonstrate that experts and
laypersons are able to identify the sex of the author accurately about 70% of the time.
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jury selection is more effectively curtailed, trial and appellate
court savings can also be expected as Batson motions decrease.
Although several legal scholars and commentators have
acknowledged the value of using questionnaires in jury selec-
tion, 8 ° no one has previously suggested examining the jury
panelists by questionnaire only and then exercising blind
peremptories.' 8' The proposal will likely meet with some opposi-
tion. This Article addresses the likely arguments below.
B. Possible Objections to the Proposal
Some will argue that at least a criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to confront the jury panelists during voir
dire.8 2 Indeed, in 1892, the Court held in Lewis v. United
See DAVID LESTER, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF HANDWRITING ANALYSIS 88-89 (1981);
Lewis R. Goldberg, Some Informal Explorations and Ruminations About Graphology,
in SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF GRAPHOLOGY: A HANDBOOK 281, 284-85 (Baruch Nevo, ed.,
1986); Maya Bar-Hillel & Gershon Ben Shakhar, TheA Priori Case Against Graphology:
Methodological and Conceptual Issues, in SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF GRAPHOLOGY: A
HANDBOOK 263, 274 (Baruch Nevo, ed., 1986). Assuming the reliability, validity, and
generalizability of these studies, even in a system of blind peremptories gender may be
discernible from the jury panelists' handwriting 70% of the time. When gender is
discernible, litigants might exercise discriminatory, gender-based peremptory challeng-
es. Cf Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League
Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 36 n.96 (1994) (reporting the concern of women law
students that "knowledge of... gender (based on handwriting) may consciously or
unconsciously influence the way that a professor grades your exam") (omission in
original). The proposed system of blind peremptories, however, still represents a
marked improvement over the current jury selection system in which gender is
discernible from physical confrontation nearly 100% of the time.
180. See Babcock, supra note 21, at 563; Frasher, supra note 144, at 1350; Saltzburg
& Powers, supra note 21, at 380; Developments in the Law-Race and the Criminal
Process, supra note 136, at 1584.
181. One legal commentator has advocated coupling the elimination of peremptory
challenges with the exercise of challenges for cause based on voir dire by questionnaire.
Christy Chandler, Race, Gender, and the Peremptory Challenge: A Postmodern Feminist
Approach, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 173, 192 (1995). In contrast, my proposal preserves
the peremptory challenge.
182. Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[tihe
defendant shall be present at ... every stage of the trial including the impaneling of
the jury." FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a). The protection provided by Rule 43, however, is
broader than the protection provided by the confrontation and due process rights of the
federal Constitution. See United States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(observing that Rule 43 codifies "both a defendant's constitutional right and his common
law right to presence"). Cf United States v. Gagnon, 721 F.2d 672, 676-77 (9th Cir.
1983) (observing that "the scope of Rule 43 is broader than that of the Sixth Amend-
ment confrontation and the Fifth Amendment due process rights), rev'd on other
grounds, 470 U.S. 522 (1985); United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489,496 (D.C. Cir.
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States8 3 that the accused was entitled to face the subject jury
panelists when exercising peremptory challenges.' 4 The Court
noted that the right of peremptory challenge came "from the
common law with the trial by jury itself, and has always been
held essential to the fairness of trial by jury."85 The Court also
noted the importance of assessing the "bare looks and gestures"
of the panelists when exercising one's challenges. 8 6 It addition-
ally appeared that even at English common law the jury panel-
ist was "'presented to the prisoner or his counsel, that they
might have a view of his person.' " 8 7 No constitutional right to
confront jury panelists during voir dire exists, however.8 8 More-
over, to the extent that Lewis addressed a criminal defendant's
right to be present (as distinct from a right of confrontation)'8 9
during jury selection, the Court subsequently has observed that
the Lewis remarks were "dictum, and no more.... with the
added observation that it deals with the rule at common law
and not with constitutional restraints."190
Certainly, a criminal defendant has a Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to be present whenever his presence has a
1983) (observing that Rule 43 is "[riooted in ... a common law right of presence," as
well as the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir.
1980) (observing that "the scope of Rule 43 was intended to be broader than the
constitutional right"). See also United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522 (1985) (separately
analyzing the defendants' Fifth Amendment Due Process and Rule 43 claims).
183. 146 US. 370 (1892).
184. See id. at 376.
185. Id. But see Georgia v. McCollum, 505 US. 42,57 (1992) (observing that"perempto-
ry challenges are not constitutionally protected fundamental rights; rather, they are but
one state-created means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a fair trial');
Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (observing that "nothing in the
Constitution of the United States... requires the Congress to grant peremptory challenges
to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured").
186. Lewis, 146 U.S. at 376.
187. Id. at 377.
188. See supra note 182. A criminal defendant does, however, enjoy the constitu-
tional right to confront the witnesses against him or her. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Indeed, the author has examined and vigorously defended a criminal defendant's
confrontation rights in the context of child sexual abuse prosecutions. See Jean
Montoya, Lessons from Akiki and Michaels on Shielding Child Witnesses, 1 PSYCHOL.,
PUB. POLY & L. 340 (1995); Jean Montoya, On Truth and Shielding in Child Abuse
Trials, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1259 (1992).
189. The Court has acknowledged that the right of confrontation is sometimes
confused with the right of presence. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107
(1934). Cf. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (observing that "the
constitutional right to presence is ... protected by the Due Process Clause in some
situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against
him").
190. Snyder, 291 US. at 117 n.2.
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reasonably substantial relationship to his opportunity to defend
against the charge.'91 The Court has acknowledged that "de-
fense may be made easier if the accused is permitted to be
present at the examination of jurors."'92 The Court has ex-
plained, however, that the presence of the accused makes
defense easier because it is in the defendant's power, "if
present, to give advice or suggestion [to his lawyer]." ' Voir
dire by questionnaire and blind peremptories would not entail
the defendant's lawyer (or any other lawyer) meeting with the
prospective jurors outside the defendant's presence. Nor would
it prevent the defendant from observing and assisting his
lawyer's performance. The defendant would be able to assist his
lawyer's construction of the questionnaire and his lawyer's
assessment of the completed questionnaires. The defendant
would also be present during his lawyer's exercise of perempto-
ry challenges-even if the jury panelists would not also be
present-and would, therefore, have the opportunity to monitor
and inform his lawyer's choices in court.
A related and more compelling argument will be that, apart
from a constitutional right to be present and confront the jury
panelists, the parties and their attorneys should, as a practical
matter, have the opportunity to observe the demeanor and body
language of the jury panelists during voir dire. A striking
number of attorneys in the survey commented on the impor-
tance of observing the jury panelists during voir dire. Professor
Saltzburg has argued that "[elvery juror's reactions should be
observable."' 94 Assuming that physical confrontation, separate
and distinct from interrogation, reliably assists jury selection,
however, the value of that physical confrontation must be
balanced against the constitutional right of litigants and jurors
to be free from invidious discrimination in jury selection. If
Batson is ineffective in detecting that discrimination, as the
case studies and the survey indicate, then the balance tips in
favor of the constitutional right.'95
191. See id. at 105-06.
192. Id. at 106. Snyder actually addressed a criminal defendant's right to be present
at a jury view of the crime scene. See id. at 103.
193. Id. at 106.
194. Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 21, at 381.
195. As Justice Marshall, concurring in Batson, observed, "'Were it necessary to
make an absolute choice between the right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in
conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to chal-
lenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a choice of the former.'" Batson, 476 U.S.
at 107 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 244 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)).
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Whether nonverbal indicators like demeanor and body lan-
guage reliably inform jury selection is, however, question-
able.196 Certainly, the value of these observations will depend
upon the nature of the voir dire. 1' For instance, Professor
Saltzburg has linked these observations to attorney-conducted
voir dire: "The advantage of having the lawyers [as opposed to
the judges] actually ask [prospective jurors questions] is that
each lawyer has an opportunity to see how a juror reacts to him
and his side of the case."198 In reality, judge-conducted voir dire
is the trend, not attorney-conducted voir dire, 9 9 so lawyers
have significantly less opportunity to "see how a juror reacts to
[them]." Voir dire restricted in length and content, also the
current trend, similarly diminishes the value of nonverbal
indicators in jury selection. 2°° Given the questionable nature of
reliance on nonverbal indicators in exercising peremptory chal-
lenges, the balance of interests tips even more clearly in favor
of the constitutional right of litigants and jurors to be free from
invidious discrimination in jury selection.
That balance tips even farther when we consider that phys-
ical confrontation with the jury panelists, the necessary pre-
condition for observation of nonverbal indicators like demeanor
and body language, has its downside for the litigants. Much
juror hostility is linked to probing, attorney-conducted voir dire
that offends the jurors.20 ' Questionnaires would minimize the
confrontational aspects of voir dire.20 2 Jury panelists would also
Indeed, the basis for his observation is well settled: The right to challenge peremptorily
is not guaranteed by the Constitution. See cases cited supra note 185.
196. See FREDERICK, supra note 159, § 4-300 (observing that "little empirical data"
exist regarding the effectiveness of various jury selection techniques, including reliance
on nonverbal indicators, and emphasizing that "much more remains to be learned");
HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 151, at 90 (observing that various jury selection tech-
niques are "probably unreliable' and specifically identifying reliance on body language
cues as "open to question").
Some, however, have emphasized the role of a jury panelist's nonverbal commu-
nication in informing an attorney's decision to exercise a peremptory challenge. See,
e.g., STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 153, §§ 12.0-15.10 (regarding the role of appear-
ance, voice, and movement in reflecting personality, character, and attitudes of
individuals); David Suggs & Bruce Dennis Sales, Using Communication Cues to
Evaluate Prospective Jurors During the Voir Dire, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 629, 633-41 (1978)
(regarding the role of communicative behaviors in evaluating jury panelists).
197. See FREDERICK, supra note 159, § 4-300.
198. Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 21, at 381 (emphasis added).
199. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
200. See FREDERICK, supra note 159, § 4-300.
201. Cf supra note 23 and accompanying text.
202. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 153, §§ 11.5.2, 11.6.3 (observing that
confrontation inhibits the openness of prospective jurors).
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be less apt to direct any hostility that they did have toward a
particular attorney or party when responding to a consolidated
case questionnaire that did not identify the author of particular
questions.
Others will argue that all blindness-based solutions to dis-
crimination are flawed, °3 primarily because these solutions
typically show more concern for process than results. Of course,
blindness-based solutions to discrimination do not necessarily
make for good law; "[riace- [and gender-] neutral policies are
only as good or bad as the results they produce."0 4 Unlike other
blindness-based solutions to discrimination, however, the solu-
tion proffered here is concerned with results-the objective
being more heterogeneous juries, or more modestly, nondiscrim-
ination in jury selection.
Batson, the current blindness-based solution to discrimina-
tion in jury selection is blindness at its worst. Batson and its
progeny tell parties and their lawyers that they cannot dis-
criminate on the basis of race or gender in jury selection-in
other words, that they must be blind to race and gender in the
exercise of their peremptory challenges. Batson is, at best,
utopian, however, because race and gender not only may mat-
ter, but are typically observable.2 5 That is to say, we are not
203. Numerous legal scholars reject the policy of colorblindness and instead advance
a policy of color-consciousness. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-
Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1062 (1991); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr.,
Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments Mas-
querading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 162, 166-67, 171-72 (1994); Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 62-63
(1991); Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and
Postmodern Constitutional Traditionalism, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57,88-91(1995);
David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REv. 99, 130-32.
204. Culp, supra note 203, at 162.
205. Professor Gotanda describes colorblind decision-making as requiring what he
calls "nonrecognition":
Before a private person or a government agent can decide "not to consider race,"
he must first recognize it. In other words, we could say that one "noticed race but
did not consider it." Of course, this two-step process arises only when the initial
recognition of race takes place, through visual identification or some other form
of racial classification.
Gotanda, supra note 203, at 6. He further describes nonrecognition's fundamental flaw:
In everyday American life, nonrecognition is self-contradictory because it is
impossible to not think about a subject without having first thought about it at
least a little. Nonrecognition differs from nonperception. Compare color-blind
nonrecognition with medical color-blindness.... This is not just a semantic
distinction. The characteristics of race that are noticed (before being ignored) are
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blind, and "'those ... who are of a mind to discriminate'" will
discriminate. 20 6 Because judges are apparently ill-equipped to
discern lawyer's intentions and reluctant to identify purposeful
discrimination,2 7 the scrutiny of suspect peremptory challenges
in a Batson hearing provides no answer. Batson also fails to
recognize that much discrimination in jury selection, like
discrimination generally, is the product of unconscious racism
and sexism.208
Voir dire by questionnaire and blind peremptories are not
foolproof antidiscrimination devices, but blindness is fairly well
achieved.0 9 There is no reason to expect that this method of
jury selection will disproportionately exclude particular
cognizable groups, despite less than promising results in other
areas. Jury selection is simply not comparable to the sort of
"merit"-based testing for jobs and school admission that
disproportionately impacts historically disadvantaged minorities
and other cognizable groups.210 For instance, the fact that
situated within an already existing understanding of race. That is, race carries
with it a complex social meaning. The proponents of color-blind nonrecognition do
not acknowledge this aspect of racial consciousness when they describe their
"neutral" decisionmaking processes.
This pre-existing race consciousness makes it impossible for an individual to
be truly nonconscious of race.
Id. at 18-19 (footnote omitted).
206. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S.
559, 562 (1953)). Professor Culp has remarked that "[t]he most difficult problem of the
colorblind principle is raised by 'peeking,' when social actors use race covertly in
making decisions." Culp, supra note 203, at 182.
207. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
209. Even Professor Culp, who generally rejects blindness-based solutions to
discrimination, has acknowledged that one way to prevent "peeking," that is, covert
racial discrimination, would be to exclude all information about race from the deliber-
ations. See Culp, supra note 203, at 191 (discussing the redistricting cases). He laments,
however, that "such exclusion is not required and, as a practical matter, will not occur."
Id.
210. For a critique of meritocracy, see Hayman, supra note 203, at 98-102. A system
of blind peremptories, including voir dire by questionnaire, assumes that jury panelists
are literate and could result in the exclusion of the uneducated and undereducated jury
panelists who are unable to complete the questionnaires. However, many jurisdictions
already have language and literacy qualifications for jurors. Among those jurisdictions
requiring jurors to have the ability to read English are the following: Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
West Virginia, and the federal courts. See ROrMAN, supra note 151, at tbl. 34, at
256-63. Among those jurisdictions requiring jurors to have the ability to write English
are the following: Arkansas, Mississippi, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
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minorities and other cognizable groups historically have been
excluded from jury service is unlikely to reduce their chances of
serving as a juror in a particular case. Indeed, lawyers may
favor traditionally excluded groups for selection because law-
yers often exclude jury panelists who have served previously on
juries. Moreover, to the extent that a category of voir dire
inquiry, like residence, disproportionately impacts particular
cognizable groups,21' the legislation providing for peremptory
challenges by questionnaire could accommodate these con-
cerns.
212
Yet others may argue that a system of blind peremptories
could make it more difficult to demonstrate unlawful discrim-
ination in jury selection than the current Batson procedures. A
litigant who has not seen the jury panelist from South Central
Los Angeles could argue that they had no way of knowing that
the excluded jury panelist was African-American. If they had no
way of knowing the race of the excluded jury panelist, it follows
that they could not have discriminated on the basis of race.
This sort of argument carried some weight in Hernandez v. New
York, 2 3 a case in which the prosecutor denied knowing which
jury panelists were Latinos.214 Carried to its logical conclusion,
however, this argument would favor nonblind peremptory
challenges.
It is the odd argument that would make it easier to discri-
minate illegally in order to make it easier to prove that discri-
mination. The bottom line has to be which procedure better
curtails unlawful discrimination in jury selection. Moreover,
given the apparent lack of rigor with which the trial courts
assess proffered neutral explanations under Batson,1 5 a system
of blind peremptories will make it only slightly more difficult
for the moving party to demonstrate unlawful discrimination in
jury selection. The moving party can still demonstrate that a
proffered explanation for a peremptory challenge is pretextual
South Dakota, Texas, and Vermont. See id. The problems raised by jury panelist
illiteracy could be remedied by providing assistance to panelists who need help
completing the questionnaire.
211. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
212. For instance, the legislation could prohibit inquiries into a jury panelist's
address or limit such inquiries to the panelist's city of residence (as opposed to the
panelist's specific neighborhood or area of residence within the city), unless the party
seeking the more specific information about residence could demonstrate good cause.
213. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
214. See id. at 356, 369-70.
215. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
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because it is the excluding lawyer's perception of race and/or
gender and that lawyer's intention. to discriminate that mat-
ter.216 Perceptions of race and/or gender could be created by the
jury panelist's answers on a questionnaire, as well as by the
jury panelist's appearance in court.217
CONCLUSION
Historically, our society has embraced the peremptory
challenge, but we also have evolved to value heterogeneous
juries. This interest in heterogeneous juries has been translat-
ed into a principle of nondiscrimination in jury selection. The
peremptory challenge and nondiscrimination in jury selection,
however, are not readily compatible. Elimination of the
peremptory challenge would result in more heterogeneous
juries because it would eliminate illegal and legal discrimina-
tion in jury selection. Assuming we want to retain peremptory
challenges but prohibit illegal discrimination in jury selection,
we will have to resolve the problem of pretextual explanations
for illegal discrimination in jury selection.
The proposal of voir dire by questionnaire and the blind
peremptory uniquely addresses the dual objectives of improving
the effectiveness of the peremptory challenge and achieving the
goals of Batson. It improves the effectiveness of the peremptory
challenge by maximizing the litigants' amount of legally rele-
vant information about the jury panelists. At the same time, it
improves the effectiveness of Batson by restricting the litigants'
access to legally irrelevant information about the jury panel-
ists, like their race, ethnicity, and sex. Juries selected blindly
will also be more heterogeneous, at least insofar as illegal
discrimination in jury selection is more effectively curtailed.
216. The California Supreme Court has observed that the true racial identity of
challenged jurors is less important than their apparent racial identity, because "dis-
crimination is more often based on appearances than verified racial descent." People v.
Motton, 704 P.2d 176, 180 (Cal. 1985) (en banc).
217. For example, in a rape or sexual harassment case, counsel should be able to
demonstrate a prima facie case of gender discrimination where evidence exists that
opposing counsel is excluding jury panelists who write "like women" or write "like





1. Given the judicial limits on the exercise of peremptory
challenges, are peremptory challenges of any value to the
litigants?*
Peremptory challenges are of great value /some value/no value.
(Please circle one.)
2. Why?
3. Were peremptory challenges of any more value pre-Batson (or
pre-Wheeler for attorneys practicing in the state courts)?
Peremptory challenges were of significantly greater value/ slightly
more value/the same value/less value. (Please circle one.)
4. Why?
5. How often has a Batson or Wheeler motion been made by you,
your co-counsel, or the opposition attorney in cases which you
have personally tried?
Such motions were made in all cases/most cases/some cases/no
cases. (Please circle one.)
* Although I circulated a draft survey for comments with no negative feedback, this
question turned out to be imprecisely worded. It should have read, "Given the
constitutional limits.." Some attorneys indicated that they thought the question was
vague. Some noted that any limits were statutory and not judicial. In any event, I
believe that the answers regarding the value of peremptory challenges remain well
taken.
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6. Do Batson/ Wheeler motions take up too much court time?
Batson/Wheeler motions do/do not take up too much court
time. (Please circle one.)
7. How difficult/easy is it to establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination in the exercise of peremptory
challenges such that the trial court asks the opposition to
justify his or her challenges?
It is very difficult/somewhat difficult/easy /very easy to establish
a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory challenges. (Please circle one.)
8. Once the trial court finds a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination, how difficult/easy is it to satisfy the trial court
that a peremptory challenge was exercised in a permissible
manner?
It is very difficult/somewhat difficult/easy/very easy to satisfy the
trial court that a peremptory challenge was exercised in a permis-
sible manner. (Please circle one.)
9. Is the venire adequately questioned before you are asked to
exercise your peremptories?
The venire is always/ usually /sometimes /never adequately ques-
tioned before I am asked to exercise my peremptories. (Please
circle one.)
10. What, if anything, interferes with adequate questioning of the
venire?
11. How is the venire usually questioned?
The venire is usually questioned by counsel/by the court/by
counsel and the court/by questionnaire/by counsel and ques-
tionnaire/by court and questionnaire /by counsel, court, and
questionnaire. (Please circle one.)
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12. Do Batson / Wheeler motions prevent unlawful discrimination in
jury selection?
Batson / Wheeler motions always/ usually/sometimes/ never pre-
vent unlawful discrimination in jury selection. (Please circle
one.)
13. Why?
14. Should peremptory challenges be eliminated from the jury
selection process?
Peremptory challenges should/should not be eliminated from the
jury selection process. (Please circle one.).
15. Why?
16. How would you describe yourself?
I am a prosecutor/defense attorney. (Please circle one.)
I have practiced as a trial attorney only in federal court/only in
state court/in both federal and state courts. (Please circle
one.)
For Attorneys Who Have Practiced in the Federal Courts:
I was/ was not practicing pre-Batson. (Please circle one.)
For Attorneys Who Have Practiced in the State Courts:
I was/was not practicing pre-Wheeler. (Please circle one.)
I have personally tried approximately jury _ trials.
(Please indicate number.)
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A PROFILE OF THE ATrORNEYS:
Prosecutors 98
Defense Attorneys 96
Federal Practice Only 9
State Practice Only 150





More than 100 trials 29
Pre-Batson Federal Practice 23
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THE ADEQUACY OF VoIR DIRE
FOR PURPOSES OF EXERCISING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The venire
is adequately Entire Defense
questioned Pool Prosecutors Attorneys
always 1 0.53% 1 1.06% 0 0.00%
usually 29 15.26% 17 18.09% 12 12.90%
sometimes 107 56.32% 57 60.64% 47 50.54%
never 53 27.89% 19 20.21% 34 36.56%
TABLE 5
THE FREQUENCY OF BATsoN/ WHEELER MOTIONS
Such motions Entire Defense
were made in Pool Prosecutors Attorneys
all cases 2 1.03% 1 1.04% 1 1.04%
most cases 10 5.13% 7 7.29% 2 2.08%
some cases 133 68.21% 55 57.29% 77 80.21%
no cases 50 25.64% 33 34.38% 16 16.67%
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PREVENTING UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION
Batson / Wheeler
motions prevent Entire Prosecutors Defense
unlawful Pool Attorneys
discrimination
always 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
usually 34 19.88% 23 28.05% 11 12.64%
sometimes 111 64.91% 45 54.88% 65 74.71%
never 26 15.20% 14 17.07% 11 12.64%
TABLE 8
PROVING PURPOSEFUL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION
It is ... to establish Defense
a prima facie case Entire Pool Prosecutors Attorneys
of discrimination
very difficult 40 23.12% 6 7.14% 34 39.53%
somewhat difficult 78 45.09% 42 50% 35 40.70%
easy 39 22.54% 24 28.57% 13 15.12%
very easy 16 9.25% 12 14.29% 4 4.65%
It is... to rebut Defense
a prima facie case Entire Pool Prosecutors Attorneys
of discrimination
very difficult 21 13.13% 6 7.89% 14 17.28%
somewhat difficult 36 22.50% 25 32.89% 11 13.58%
easy 80 50% 39 51.32% 39 48.15%
very easy 23 14.38% 6 7.89% 17 20.99%
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How JURY PANELISTS ARE QUESTIONED
The venire is usually Entire Prosecutors Defense
questioned by: Pool Attorneys
counsel only 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
court only 109 59.24% 48 53.93% 59 64.13%
counsel and court 54 29.35% 28 31.46% 25 27.17%
questionnaire 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
counsel and
questionnaire 1 0.54% 1 1.12% 0 0.00%
court and
questionnaire 14 7.61% 8 8.99% 6 6.52%
counsel, court,
and questionnaire 6 3.26% 4 4.49% 2 2.17%
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